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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 
 
Altınbay, Egehan Hayrettin 
 
M. A. , Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Serdar Ş. Güner 
 
 
September 2013 
 
 
 
This thesis, through a game theoretic methodology, aims to build an accurate game 
theoretic model of the Second Punic War, and tries to analyze the military strategies 
and actions taken by the Carthaginian and Roman Republics. After observing that 
the modeling literature concerning the game theoretic studies of war has generally 
analyzed the wars beginning from the 19th century, this thesis also aims to provide a 
contribution to the game theoretic literature by constructing a model that displays 
the strategic interaction between Rome and Carthage. By starting from the question 
of how one could game theoretically model the Second Punic War and what 
argumentations would such a model would give, the work presented here compiles 
the available historical information regarding the military choices of the two 
Republics, and by using those literary findings, tries to explain the reasons behind 
Carthage’s offense and Rome’s defense choices. By arguing that the findings 
through game theoretic analysis is compatible with the historical literary evidence, 
 iv 
the model also reveals novel argumentations concerning under what conditions both 
states would or would not prefer a particular military action.  
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 v 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
 
 
II. PÖN SAVAŞI’NIN OYUN TEORİSİ İLE ANALİZİ  
 
Altınbay, Egehan Hayrettin 
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Eylül 2013 
 
 
 
M. Ö. 218 – 201 yıllarında Kartaca ve Roma Cumhuriyetleri arasında yaşanan 
İkinci Pön Savaşı’nı oyun kuramsal bir yöntemle analiz etmeyi amaçlayan bu 
çalışma, bu savaşın literatürdeki ilk modellemesini yapmakta ve bu iki devletin 
tarihçiler tarafından çok fazla değinilmemiş olan askeri stratejilerini ve hamlelerini 
incelemektedir. Literatürde genel olarak askeri tarihten 19.yüzyıl ve sonrası dönemi 
savaşlarını ve bu savaşlardaki devletlerin stratejik etkileşimlerine uygulanan oyun 
kuramının, antik savaşlara da uygulanabilirliğini ve mevcut askeri tarih literatürüne 
bir katkı yapmak amacıyla yazılan bu tez, Kartaca ve Roma Cumhuriyetleri’nin 
İkinci Pön Savaşları’ndaki askeri stratejilerini ve buna bağlı olarak askeri harekat 
tercihlerini incelemektedir.  İkinci Pön Savaşı nasıl oyun kuramı ile modellenebilir 
ve bu modellemeden ne gibi sonuçlar çıkarılabilir sorusuyla başlayan bu tez, 
Kartaca ve Roma’nın hamle tercihlerini geriye doğru çıkarsama tekniğiyle 
incelemektedir. İki devletin de savaş hamlelerini belirli kriterlerin sağlanması 
 vi 
doğrultusunda seçtiklerini savunan bu çalışma, oyun kuramsal bulguların tarih 
literatürüyle de uyumlu olduğu sonucuna varmıştır.  
 Anahtar kelimeler: İkinci Pön Savaşı, Oyun Kuramı, Kartaca, Roma 
 vii 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEGMENTS 
 
 
 
 This thesis was not made possible without the assistance and support of my 
professors, family, and friends. I would like to thank them all for their effort, 
patience, and trust.  
 
 I would like to give my greatest gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Serdar Güner who 
introduced me to the topic of game theory and its application to international 
politics. Without his support I would never be able to produce such an extraordinary 
work.  
 
 I would also extend my appreciation to Asst. Prof. Özgür Özdamar who 
always supported me in my master’s studies and encouraged me to push my limits in 
order to reach the level of perfection.  
 
 Additionally I would like to offer my special thanks to Asst. Prof. İlker 
Aytürk who enlightened me with his innovative comments and remarks. Without his 
assistance, I would not be able to bring my work into being. 
 
 I wish to thank my family members who were always there for me; however 
this study would not be able to bear fruit especially without the help of my sister 
Aslıhan, who excels in the field of mathematics and logic.  
 viii 
 
 I would like to extend my gratitude to my friends especially İsmail Erkam 
Sula, and to my other research associates most notably Onur Erpul, Selçuk 
Türkmen, Emre Baran, Toygar Halistoprak, Ömer Faruk Kavuk, Yusuf Gezer, 
Didem Aksoy, Gülce Türker, Tuna Gürsu, Yaşın Yavuz, Sercan Canbolat, Uluç 
Karakaş, and the members of the Bilkent IR football team who helped me improve 
my research and produce interesting ideas. 
 
 Lastly I would like to thank the Bilkent IR faculty members, especially 
Assoc. Prof. Pınar Bilgin, Asst.Prof. Nur Bilge Criss, and the administrative 
assistants, Fatma Toga Yılmaz, and Ekin Fiteni for their support.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii 
ÖZET .......................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEGMENTS ........................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. xii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
1.1.  Introduction to the Research ........................................................................... 1 
1.2. The Research Question .................................................................................... 3 
1.3. Methodology .................................................................................................... 4 
1.4. Findings ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.5. Thesis Overview .............................................................................................. 7 
CHAPTER II: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR ..... 9 
2.1. Introduction to Chapter II ................................................................................ 9 
2.2. Carthage and Rome Prior to the Second Punic War ...................................... 10 
2.2.1. Carthage .................................................................................................. 10 
2.2.2. Rome ....................................................................................................... 13 
2.3. Carthaginian and Roman Relations before the Second Punic War ............... 16 
2.4. Carthaginian and Roman Strategic Interactions: The Second Punic War ..... 18 
2.4.1. Causes of the Second Punic War ............................................................ 18 
2.5. General Strategic Overview of the Second Punic War .................................. 21 
2.6. Roman and Carthaginian Strategies at the Beginning of the Second Punic 
War ........................................................................................................................ 25 
2.6.1. Carthaginian Grand Strategy in the Second Punic War .......................... 26 
2.6.2. Roman Grand Strategy in the Second Punic War ................................... 30 
2.7. Carthaginian and Roman Military Strategies at the Outset of the Second 
Punic War ............................................................................................................. 31 
2.7.1. Carthaginian (Hannibal’s) Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second 
Punic War ......................................................................................................... 33 
2.7.1.1. Hannibal’s Intention to Attack ......................................................... 33 
2.7.2. Hannibal’s Choice of Land Attack ......................................................... 39 
2.7.2.1.   Naval Complications ...................................................................... 40 
2.7.2.2. Roman Naval Dominance in the Mediterranean Sea ....................... 46 
2.7.2.3. The Element of Surprise .................................................................. 47 
2.7.2.4. Hannibal’s Character as a Land General ......................................... 48 
2.7.2.5. Hannibal’s Gain-cost Analysis ........................................................ 49 
2.7.2.6. The Celtic Factor ............................................................................. 51 
2.7.2.7. The Defensive Element of Hannibal’s Military Strategy ................ 53 
2.8. Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second Punic War ................. 53 
 x 
2.8.1. Initial Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second Punic War 56 
2.8.2. The Altered Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the War ............. 57 
2.9. Conclusion for Chapter II .............................................................................. 65 
CHAPTER III: THE SECOND PUNIC WAR MODEL .......................................... 67 
3.1. Introduction to Chapter III ............................................................................. 67 
3.2. Why Game Theoretic Methodology? ............................................................ 67 
3.3. Why Model the Second Punic War? .............................................................. 70 
3.4. Why Sequential Game Model in Extensive Form?........................................ 75 
3.5. Building the Model ........................................................................................ 77 
3.5.1. The Set of Players ................................................................................... 77 
3.5.2. The Temporal Domain of the Model ...................................................... 79 
3.5.3. The Spatial Domain of the Model ........................................................... 80 
3.5.4. The Order of Moves ................................................................................ 81 
3.5.5. The Players’ Actions ............................................................................... 81 
3.5.6. Outcomes ................................................................................................ 84 
3.5.7. Preferences of Players ............................................................................. 85 
3.5.8. Information ............................................................................................. 86 
3.5.9. Payoffs .................................................................................................... 87 
3.6. The Game Tree Representation of the Second Punic War ............................ 88 
3.6.1. Notation for the Game Tree .................................................................... 89 
3.7. Action Profile of the Players .......................................................................... 90 
3.8. The Equilibria Table ...................................................................................... 91 
3.9. Conclusion for Chapter III ............................................................................. 93 
CHAPTER IV: THE SOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND 
PUNIC WAR EXTENSIVE FORM GAME ............................................................ 95 
4.1. Introduction to Chapter IV ............................................................................. 95 
4.2. Solution of the Second Punic War Model ..................................................... 96 
4.3. The Calculation of Expected Utilities from War ........................................... 96 
4.4. The SPW Game in its Extensive Form with Calculated Expected Utilities .. 98 
4.5. General Remarks Regarding the SPW Game Model Analysis ...................... 99 
4.6. Findings from the Equilibrium Analysis ..................................................... 101 
4.6.1. Equilibrium 1 ........................................................................................ 101 
4.6.1.1. Rome’s Active Defense choice against Carthaginian Land Attack 102 
4.6.1.2. Rome’s Active Defense choice against Carthaginian Naval Attack
 .................................................................................................................... 107 
4.6.1.3. Carthage’s Choice of Land Attack ................................................. 112 
4.6.2. Remarks Regarding the Alternative Second Punic War Interactions ... 118 
4.6.2.1 Rome’s Passive Defense vs. Carthaginian Land Attack ................. 118 
4.6.2.2. Rome’s Passive Defense vs. Carthaginian Naval Attack............... 119 
4.6.2.3. Carthaginian Naval Attack Decision ............................................. 121 
4.6.2.4. The Status Quo Situation ............................................................... 122 
4.7. Concluding Remarks Regarding the Equilibrium Analysis ......................... 124 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 133 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 139 
 
 xi 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1. The Equilibria Table ……………………………………………………92 
 xii 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Game Tree of the Second Punic War Game Model………………89 
Figure 2. The Game Tree of the Second Punic War with the Calculated Expected 
Utilities…………………………………………………………………………….98 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction to the Research 
 
The Roman – Carthaginian Wars, or more commonly known, as the Punic 
Wars were one of the most intriguing strategic interactions between two rival 
powers who were seeking political, economic, and military dominance within the 
western and central Mediterranean regions throughout the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. 
The war is intriguing since it is not only one of the longest armed conflicts in history 
(264 – 146 BC), but also possesses extraordinary Carthaginian and Roman 
characters, impressive tactical accomplishments, bold political decisions, and 
surprising strategic moves. These feats were evident in Hamilcar Barca’s defense of 
eastern Sicily, Hannibal Barca’s crossing the Alps with an army, Hasdrubal 
Boeotarch’s tenacious defense of the Carthaginian capital, or Regulus’ amphibious 
North African campaign, Scipio Africanus’ victory over Hannibal’s military genius, 
and Scipio Aemilianus’ systematic siege of the great city of Carthage.  
 
However, even though the characters or the events are colorful, interesting, 
or dynamic, when compared with the military strategic studies on the Macedonian – 
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Persian Wars (Buckley, 1996; Green, 1996; de Souza 2003) or the Peloponnesian 
Wars of Ancient Greece (Romilly, 1963; Strassler, 1996; Hanson, 2005), the 
literature and the number of strategic analyses that touch upon the events of the 
Punic Wars are relatively low in number (Fronda, 2010). The lack of primary 
sources that describe the strategic decision making process - which is true for 
Carthage since Rome utterly destroyed the civilization in 146 BC -, unrecovery of 
the historical analysis books written in the Middle Roman Republican era, such as 
the complete version of the book of Polybius (1984), and the complexity or 
interconnectedness of the events of the Punic Wars have presented large obstacles 
for historians to present a coherent military strategic perspective to the Roman – 
Carthaginian conflict (Fronda, 2010).  
 
Therefore this condition was proved to be interesting and has prompted me 
to ask whether a student of international relations and war could produce an 
additional analysis to the Roman – Carthaginian conflict and by the use of game 
modeling, provide an unorthodox scrutiny to the military strategic aspect of the long 
lasting Rome – Carthage strategic interaction with a new methodology which would 
combine ancient history and game theory. Under this agenda my aim was to 
concentrate on the Punic Wars and touch upon the military strategic aspect of the 
conflict by contemplating on the military actions and decisions of both states. 
However, regarding the length of the Roman – Carthaginian Wars, rather than 
analyzing the whole 120 year long conflict, the main intention was given solely to 
investigate the Second Punic War, which stands as the peak point of the Punic Wars 
and the one with the best documentation. This study, by concentrating on the Second 
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Punic War, and through a game theoretic analysis, seeks to answer several military 
strategic questions such as when or how the Carthaginians could have chosen a 
particular offensive military action, or under what circumstances the Romans could 
have preferred a defensive approach to protect against the Carthaginians.  Similar 
questions have also been dealt with various military historians, and there are 
numerous diverse answers to the questions such as these, but it is possible to observe 
that a coherent explanation of the military strategic aspect of the Punic Wars with a 
non historic method was missing, thereby presenting an area of research and a field 
to contribute on the literature of military history and game theory.  
 
1.2. The Research Question 
 
By arguing that there was an obscurity in the military strategic aspect 
concerning the Punic Wars, and an available area within the game theoretic 
literature that could be supplemented with a study of an ancient war, it was decided 
that the thesis presented here should be a contributory one with novel explanations 
to both history and studies of game theoretic modeling. Therefore, the main research 
question is determined to be interesting, precise and clear, and touch upon the 
militaristic side of the Roman – Carthaginian interaction. Under this framework, the 
research question is the following: How could one model the Second Punic War 
using game theory, and how would such a game theoretic analysis would make a 
contribution to the available literature of ancient military history. Since the Second 
Punic War is a complex long-lasting armed conflict, a model that would completely 
reflect and cover the whole interaction between Rome and Carthage is extremely 
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difficult to construct. Therefore such a phenomenon prompted me to focus solely on 
the first phase (218 – 216 BC) of the armed confrontation and analyze the 
Carthage’s offense and Rome’s defense. This time frame is regarded as the peak of 
the confrontation between Rome and Carthage, and provides the best opportunity for 
a researcher to conceptualize the strategies and actions of both states in utmost 
clarity (Connolly, 1998). In this first phase there was only the Italian front in the 
central Mediterranean region, where Carthage, by having the initiative, aimed to 
pursue an offensive military strategy, and Rome, surprised by the sudden move of 
Carthage via the Alps, holds the defense. The game theoretic model therefore 
presents the interaction of Carthage and Rome and looks at their decision taking 
procedure by analyzing the actions at their disposal at the outset of the Second Punic 
War. 
 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
The work presented here aims to make a contribution to the game theoretic, 
military history, and ancient history literature, thereby intends to combine the 
methods of game theoretic modeling and historical analysis aiming to reach novel 
deductions. Game theory was chosen to be the main method to make inferences 
from the interaction between Rome and Carthage because it is a powerful analysis 
tool that through its interactive inference and modeling techniques, consistent and 
systematic structure, and scientificality, it helps to induce arguments that may have 
been missed by social scientists who have generally applied or used different verbal 
research methods to analyze complex social or strategic interactions. Game theory, 
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with its systematic and mathematical nature allows the researcher to more clearly 
observe the exchange of relations, mutually affecting moves or actions between 
parties and makes inferences through mathematical operationalization, 
conceptualizing the actors (Carthage and Rome), their strategies or actions, 
preferences, utilities, and payoffs so that prediction or additional argumentations 
could be reproduced. 
 
The other method that is intended to supplement the research was the 
historical analysis. Since the research question deals with a historical event from the 
3rd century BC, it is needed to historically analyze the written evidence and the 
research done by historians before building a game theoretic model and a strategic 
explanation for the interaction. Since due to the misfortune that I do not possess the 
skill in reading Latin or Phoenician, which are the native tongues of Rome and 
Carthage, there are no primary sources that are used in the historical analysis; hence, 
the information is obtained mainly through the secondary sources that were written 
during the 20th and 21st centuries. However, ancient historians such as Livius (1972) 
and Polybius (1984) are extensively used and their observations and descriptions are 
also mentioned. Through the historical analysis method my intention was to 
establish a base for the model and look for verbal descriptions for the interaction. 
 
 
1.4. Findings 
 
With the application and the combination of the game theoretic and historical 
case study analysis methods, it is observed that a successful game model which 
reflects the Roman – Carthaginian interaction in the first phase of the Second Punic 
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War, can be constructed, solved, and interpreted. The exemplification of this game 
theoretic modeling of the Second Punic War is believed to be the first and only 
systematic interaction schema that denotes Rome’s and Carthage’s actions, utilities, 
outcomes, and payoffs.  Under this framework, it was found out that Carthage, at the 
outset of the conflict possessed three possible military actions which were land 
attack, naval attack, and no attack where Carthage would choose to implement one 
of them according to its expected utility, the satisfaction of several conditions, and 
the existence of diverse cases. On the other hand, since there was no explicit 
conceptualization or definition of Rome’s military action profile at the outset of the 
Second Punic War, with the use of my own interpretation of the historical literary 
evidence, it is argued that Rome, after realizing a Carthaginian attack, possessed two 
military options, active defense and passive defense, that intended to impede the 
Punic advance. Similar to Carthage, it was also observed that with respect to the 
game model, Rome would have chosen active defense over passive defense or vice 
versa depending on the satisfaction of several conditions and the existence of several 
cases that validate the Rome’s conditions. With the solution of the model and the 
interpretation of the findings, it was found out that only the first equilibrium which 
reflects the actual interaction observed in history is compatible with the previous 
historical explications; however, since the game model enables the analysis of the 
other alternative interactions and outcomes of the war, their interpretation gives new 
arguments on the counterfactual side of the Second Punic War. 
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1.5. Thesis Overview 
 
The thesis is comprised of five parts which are: the Introduction Chapter, 
Historical Analysis Chapter, Game Theoretic Modeling Chapter, the Solution and 
Interpretation Chapter, and the Conclusion Chapter respectively. The Introductory 
section explains the research question, the reason for it to be chosen and other 
details regarding the research design. The Historical Analysis Chapter provides a 
literature review on the brief history of Carthage and Rome by giving extensive 
emphasis on the military strategic aspect of the Second Punic War. Historical 
interpretations, observations, and information regarding the interaction between 
Carthage and Rome, the reason behind their military actions and the brief history of 
the causes and content of the war is also presented here. In the Game Theoretic 
Modeling Chapter, the construction process of the Second Punic War Extensive 
Form Game is presented. The section descriptively analyzes why those players are 
chosen, why those actions are attached to the players, what kind of payoffs they had, 
and the outcome of their interaction is provided.  In the Solution and Interpretation 
section the solution of the game theoretic model through backward induction is 
shown, results from the equilibria that reflect not only the actual observed 
interaction in the Second Punic War but also other possible alternative interactions 
that could have occurred in the war are examined, and are compared with the 
available literary evidence. In addition, this chapter mentions that the findings 
through the backward induction solution does provide contributions to the literature 
or can be supplemented by examples from history, and therefore display that the 
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model is successful in reflecting the first phase of the Second Punic War. The 
concluding section wraps up the work done in the thesis and provides areas of 
weakness, additional zones that could be examined through the studies that can be 
done in the future, and possible extensions to be done in other models. In the 
Appendix, the display of the solution of the extensive form game and the result 
obtainment process is presented.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction to Chapter II 
 
As a historical base for the modeling section, this chapter scrutinizes a 
historical overview concerning the Roman and Carthaginian civilizations and their 
interaction throughout the classical ages. It was observed that although both states 
looked familiar in their domestic affairs,   their geostrategic positions had prompted 
them to pursue different agendas. By providing a succinct analysis on their strategic 
interactions, the chapter examines the relations of the two powers and their 
strategies at the outset of the Second Punic War and argues that Carthage had an 
offense oriented military strategy whereas Rome pursued a defensive one. In the 
final part, the chapter ends by stating that both states had in mind certain predefined 
grand and military strategies and by providing examples from the historical events, 
the chapter presents that their strategies can be defined using modern military 
concepts and they can be accurately conceptualized for the game theoretic modeling 
of the Second Punic War. 
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2.2. Carthage and Rome Prior to the Second Punic War 
 
 
2.2.1. Carthage 
 
Carthage, or originally known as Kart Hadasht, was the capital city of the 
Carthaginian state and the main metropolis of the Carthaginian civilization. The city 
was founded in the early years of the 9th century BC in the territory of Tunisia by 
Phoenician1 colonists and Semitic maritime settlers who had departed from the 
Levant, especially from the city of Tyre (Lancel, 1997). The Phoenicians, who had 
formed an ancient civilization in the territories of modern day Lebanon and 
Palestine, were renowned for their commercial and overseas activities across the 
Mediterranean Sea (Khader and Soren, 1987). Carthage for example, was not their 
first overseas settlement; they had formed such colonies around the Mediterranean 
region for economic resources and commercial purposes (Boak, 1950). Hence, these 
people from the Levant that had landed near the vicinity of the modern day Tunis, 
named their small North African settlement Kart-Hadasht, which means “new 
town” in Semitic, so that they could distinguish their new settlement from the other 
nearby Phoenician ones (Khader and Soren, 1987). These early Phoenicians 
primarily used this settlement as a trading post to ensure economic and commercial 
links with the surrounding native populations, and with their home country (Starr, 
1971).  
                                                 
1 The word Phoenician comes from Phoiníkē, which means “dark skinned” in Greek. The Greeks 
used that word to refer to the Canaanites (an Eastern Mediterranean people who lived in the Levant 
between the years 1200-600 BC). The Romans on the other hand, regarded the Carthaginians as the 
descendants of the Phoenicians who came to Africa in the 9th Century BC, and therefore adopted the 
Latinized equivalent for the word Phoiníkē, and called the Carthaginians as Punica (Sidwell and 
Jones, 1997).  
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During the 7th century and onwards, Carthage expanded its sphere of 
influence towards the nearby regions, exerting a loose political control over the 
adjacent settlements and cities. However, the Carthaginians did not aim to conquer 
territories or sought to rule them directly; on the contrast, many subjugated 
settlements only nominally recognized the Carthaginian influence and generally 
either paid tribute or granted the Carthaginians access to the natural resources within 
the area (Boak, 1950).  For the purpose of gaining access to mineral and other 
commercial resources, and due to their indirect approach regarding political and 
economic expansion, the Carthaginians sought a colonial expansion towards the 
western Mediterranean coasts, north western Africa, the Baleares, the Maltese, 
Corsica and Sardinian islands, and the southern regions of the Iberian Peninsula 
(Miles, 2010).  The maritime and commercial expansion of the Carthaginians, and 
their alliance with the previously established Phoenician colonies triggered a rivalry 
with the Greeks, who were also seeking access and possession of the trading 
resources of the Mediterranean. This confrontation eventually escalated into a long 
lasting armed conflict with the Greeks of western Mediterranean (the Punic – Greek 
Wars in Sicily) and the Greeks of eastern Mediterranean (the Pyrrhic – Punic Wars) 
where both nations fought for maritime and economic supremacy.  In the late 3rd 
century BC, prior to the initiation of the Punic Wars, Carthage directly and 
indirectly controlled settlements and regions in southern Spain, the coast of North 
Africa from Morocco to Libya, the Balearic Islands, Corsica, Sardinia, the Maltase 
Islands, and the western part of Sicily in 264 BC (Demircioğlu, 2011).   
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Carthage, even though was set up as a monarchy, after the 5th century BC, it 
was an oligarchic republic that had a well functioning political system with 
executive, judicial, and administrative state organs. The head of the state and the 
executive branch was represented by the two annually elected judges called suffettes 
who were responsible to supervise the functionality of the state mechanisms 
(Scullard, 1991). Under the suffettes, other bodies that were part of the executive 
branch was the Council of Elders, which implemented matters of state, the Senate, 
which discussed decisions to be taken regarding matters of economy or foreign 
policy, and the Popular Assembly, which represented the middle class, dealing with 
domestic matters and legislation. The judiciary branch was the Council of 104, 
which was comprised of 104 elected high jurists who audited the judicial matters, 
and the legality or the legitimacy of the decisions taken in the domestic or 
international affairs (Scullard, 1991).  
 
The economy of Carthage included diverse elements of production and 
commerce. Since Carthage had a large maritime fleet and a large colonial empire 
stretching from Spain in the west and Libya in the east, the Carthaginians acquired 
large wealth from the international trade of mineral resources such as silver, gold, 
and tin of the Iberian Peninsula, purple dye obtained from murex shells, the textiles 
industry, rich craftsmanship culture, jewellery, and agricultural production 
(Scullard, 1955). Such an economic system elevated the Carthaginians to become 
one of the wealthiest nations of the antiquity (Khader and Soren, 1987).  The 
economic and political competition over the acquisition of dominance in the 
Western and Central Mediterranean required a large naval fleet, and a versatile army 
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for the sustainment of Carthaginian dominance on the regions surrounding the 
Mediterranean Sea. However, unlike other Mediterranean civilizations such as the 
Greeks and the Romans, the Carthaginians tended to rely heavily on mercenaries 
rather than conscripted citizen armies. Apart from a small core of elite units and the 
generals, the majority of the Carthaginian army was comprised of mercenary troops 
of different origins whom were called from diverse regions of Africa, Spain, the 
Baleares, France, and Greece (Wise and Hook, 1982). 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Rome 
 
Rome was initially founded as a village during the 8th century BC by the 
native Latin and Sabine peoples who were living a pastoral lifestyle on the Alban 
hills situated at the south of the river Tiber (Forsythe, 2005). Rome constituted a 
part of the conglomeration of villages in the Alban region; however its geography 
provided many political, economic and military advantages to its development 
(Christiansen, 1995). It was founded in a hilly terrain that had a mild climate 
suitable for agricultural activities, it was surrounded by several hills at the east that 
provided natural protection, it had access to the navigable river Tiber which 
provided economic activities, it was far from the pirate ridden coast, and it was 
adjacent to the commercial crossroads that lay at the center of two highly 
sophisticated civilizations, the Etruscans at the north, and the Samnites and Greeks 
at the south (Demircioğlu, 2011). With regards to the neighboring powerful states 
and societies in Italy, the Roman expansion was slow in the peninsula, and it would 
take nearly 600 years for the Romans to take control of all of Italy. 
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During the early history of Rome, such as in the 7th and 6th centuries BC, 
Rome was within the Etruscan sphere of influence, which not only made a great 
impact on the transformation of the its status as a village into a city, but also affected 
the culture and socio-economy of the Roman society, where marvelous districts, 
roads, marble buildings, and industries were established thereby transforming Rome 
from a minor settlement to a major political and commercial center in the Latium 
region (Myres, 1950). By 509 BC the Romans overthrew the Etruscan monarchic 
system and declared themselves as a Republic (Havell, 1996). In the 5th century BC, 
the Romans warred for along time with the neighboring peoples, the Latins, the 
Sabines, the Etruscans, the Lavini, the Volscians, and the Veii, for over the 
dominance of the Latin territories, and established themselves as a potent entity in 
the Latium region (Scullard, 1991).  
 
In the early 4th century BC, the Gauls invaded Italy and sacked Rome. 
However, the Romans successfully recovered from this loss; rebuilt their city, 
reestablished their political alliance system with the neighboring cities and peoples, 
defeated the Samnites who had attacked Rome’s coastal allies, and by 290 BC, had 
greatly consolidated their position in central Italy (Demircioğlu, 2011). In the places 
they established dominance, the Romans planted colonies or signed political 
agreements so that they could integrate those regions into their own political system, 
suppress any signs of possible unrest, and more easily use the local economic 
resources (Christiansen, 1995).  By the early 3rd century BC and prior to the Punic 
Wars, Rome had expanded its sphere of influence to the south of Italy, incorporating 
the Greek city states into its sphere of influence. This Roman – Italian – Greek 
 15 
politic, economic, and military alliance system integrated Rome and its allies on the 
basis of a string of treaties which the allied city states, in exchange for partial 
domestic autonomy and participation to Roman politics, paid tribute and provided 
Rome with soldiers in times of war (Starr, 1983).  
 
Rome until 509 BC was governed as a kingdom, with kings having large 
executive powers; however, from the 6th century BC to the 1st century AD, Rome 
was a republic. The head of the government was represented by the two annually 
elected consuls who had high authority and powers linked to the executive organ of 
the state (Cary & Scullard, 1976). Other state organs, the legislation and the 
judiciary, were divided among the Century Assembly and the Tribal Assembly 
which were comprised of aristocrats and the commons (Cary & Scullard, 1976). The 
Roman Senate, which was also part of the political mechanism, had a significant 
advisory role that guided the decision making process of the two Assemblies. The 
decisions taken in the Assemblies were sent to the Senate for approval, and were 
then accordingly implemented (Myres, 1950).  The economy of the Roman Republic 
rose on three main pillars: agriculture, trade, and industry (Havell, 1996).  The 
Romans gave great emphasis on self-sufficiency and relied on improved irrigation 
techniques using aqueducts. They also constructed mills to increase their food 
production and the well functioning economy contributed to the army’s upkeep and 
logistics (Cornell & Matthews, 1988). Since the Romans had many rival and 
antagonistic neighbors, such as Gauls or Samnites, they opted for a strong and 
capable army that could sustain wars of attrition or able to conduct extensive 
military operations.  
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2.3. Carthaginian and Roman Relations before the Second Punic War 
 
The interactions between the two great powers of the Mediterranean were 
multi phased and multi-layered throughout history. Primarily, beginning with a 
mutual friendship and trade agreement in the 6th century BC, the Roman – 
Carthaginian relations witnessed complex political, economic, and military 
interactions, such as the signing of significant treaties related to the demarcation 
spheres of influence zones in the Mediterranean Sea or large scale armed conflicts 
that would last for more that 120 years.  Overall, it is possible to observe a 
fluctuating relationship. 
  
In the first phase of their interactions (509 – 264 BC) the Carthaginians and 
the Romans were cordial towards each other, aiming for the preservation of the 
status quo in the central Mediterranean region (Demircioglu, 2011). For that purpose 
their interactions revolved around the conclusion of several political and economic 
treaties that not only demarcated both states’ spheres of influence but also their 
economic activity zones in the Mediterranean (Polybius, 1984). During this period 
and prior to the Punic Wars, Rome and Carthage had concluded four major strategic 
treaties (509 BC, 348 BC, 306 BC, and 279 BC) that reflected mutually agreed 
political, economic, and military terms, stipulating the prevention of one party from 
interfering into the domestic and international affairs of the other (Forsythe, 2005). 
The treaties and its terms were altered only after the previous treaty failed to 
respond to the newly existing political conjecture or when one party demanded to 
scrutinize the previous stipulations (Demircioglu, 2011). When the Carthaginian 
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wars with the Greeks or the Roman wars with the Samnites and with Pyrrhus are 
taken into consideration, the treaties were successful in sustaining the clause of non-
intervention, and cordial relations between the two and preserved the status quo in 
the central Mediterranean region. 
  
The second phase (264 – 238 BC) of the Roman – Carthaginian interactions 
followed a different course where, rather than treaties, wars and political crises 
dictated the mutual affairs of the two Republics. A local crisis in Eastern Sicily 
prompted both Rome and Carthage to intervene into the predicament, which over 
time, triggered a full scale armed conflict called the Punic Wars. This was the first 
time when Roman – Carthaginian relations evolved into a new level where their 
interactions were guided through war and the ambition to acquire political, 
economic, and military dominance in the central Mediterranean (Hoyos, 2010). The 
First Punic War lasted for 23 years and ended in defeat of Carthage. Rome, 
emerging victorious, dictated harsh terms on the Carthaginians which provoked an 
upheaval in the political and economic dynamics within the Punic state. Afterwards, 
Rome, observing the weak Carthaginian status, intervened into the Corsican and 
Sardinian affairs and secured both islands by intimidating the Punic state to abandon 
its political and economic rights thereby the Romans consolidated their post-war 
position.  
 
With Rome holding the upper hand in the central Mediterranean and 
Carthage suffering the costs of the First Punic War, the third phase (237 – 218 BC) 
of the Roman – Carthaginian interactions witnessed Carthaginian aims for recovery, 
and Roman ambitions to curtail a possible Carthaginian challenge to the Roman 
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power (Goldsworthy, 2000). The Carthaginians, especially under the influence of 
the Barcid faction had embarked on an expedition to Spain where the possession of 
the Iberian mineral and commercial resources would enable a significant recovery. 
The Carthaginians not only needed additional resources to compensate for their 
losses in the First Punic War but also to set up a formidable army away from Roman 
intervention. Rome, suspicious of Carthaginian intentions in Spain, sent several 
envoys, and high level diplomatic contact between the two states took place (Cary 
and Scullard, 1976). In 226 BC, the Romans concluded a controversial treaty with 
the Carthaginian commander in chief operating in Iberia so that they could prevent 
further Carthaginian incursion into northern and eastern Spain, and to set up a buffer 
zone for their allied settlements in the western Mediterranean (Scullard, 1991).   
From 220 BC and onwards, the Roman – Carthaginian interactions became tense 
again. A local crisis in Eastern Spain led to the intervention of both Carthage and 
Rome to settle the matter in their own favor. Both states did not back down and the 
hostilities were renewed initiating the Second Punic War which would last for 17 
years. 
 
 
2.4. Carthaginian and Roman Strategic Interactions: The Second Punic War 
 
 
2.4.1. Causes of the Second Punic War 
 
There are political, economic, and military causes that triggered the Second 
Punic War; however Polybius (1984) states that the causes of the conflict can be 
categorized under three main factors. The first one was the Carthaginian bitterness 
and resentment to the Roman actions after the First Punic War, that is, Rome’s 
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opportunistic seizure of Sardinia, Corsica, and other lesser central Mediterranean 
islands while Carthage was struggling with a mercenary uprising in 240 BC. Rome, 
being aware that Carthage was weak and unable to effectively respond to a political 
crisis in Sardinia, had militarily intervened to the island, thereby adding Sardinia 
and the adjacent islands under its own control. Carthage, not desiring a new 
confrontation with Rome, while the Mercenary War still continued, backed down. 
Hence, in reference to Polybius (1984), the Sardinian event not only emboldened the 
already existing Carthaginian antagonistic perception towards Rome, but also 
prompted a Carthaginian desire to regain its lost territories, prestige, and influence 
in the central Mediterranean.  
 
Regarding Polybius (1984), the second factor that contributed for the 
eruption of the Second Punic War was the Carthaginian, especially the House of 
Barca’s, desire to build up a base in Spain, and the subsequent Roman reaction to 
check the expanding Carthaginian military - political presence in the Iberian 
Peninsula. After the Mercenary War the Carthaginians opted for regaining their 
military and economic power in the Mediterranean region. For that purpose, in 237 
BC, Hamilcar Barca had embarked on an expedition to Spain to rejuvenate the 
Carthaginian fighting potential through the economic and human resources of the 
vast Iberian Peninsula. Hamilcar, and later on Hasdrubal expanded the Carthaginian 
sphere of influence by adding the central and eastern portions of Spain, and 
Carthage re-gained control of various minerals and goods of trade. However, when 
their Spanish colonies and commercial interests began to come under pressure from 
the expanding Carthaginians, the Greeks of Massilia contacted Rome and requested 
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their political aid (Scullard, 1991). Apart from the Greeks, the Romans were also 
suspicious of the Carthaginian revival in the Iberian Peninsula; though their wars 
with the Illyrians in had prevented them to directly interfere with the politics of 
Spain (Demircioğlu, 2011). Nevertheless, rather than pursuing military action, the 
Romans, for the purpose of checking the Carthaginian motives of northwards 
expansion chose to send several envoys for diplomatic intimidation. The Romans 
were successful in reaching an agreement with the Carthaginians in 226 BC, in 
which the river Ebro was demarcated as the northernmost boundary for the 
Carthaginian sphere of influence and crossing of the river in arms meant immediate 
war, which Hannibal crossed it in 218 BC, and broke the truce according to the 
Romans (Cary & Scullard, 1976).   
  
In conjunction with the second cause, the third factor was the Saguntine 
crisis (Polybius, 1984). In 223 BC, with regard to an appeal of the pro-Roman 
faction within Saguntum concerning the political pressures of the Carthaginians, the 
Romans had concluded an alliance with the aforementioned city. Two years later, 
Rome, with regards to its alliance agreement with Saguntum, intervened to the 
domestic affairs of Saguntum and ended a political crisis between the two parties by 
executing the pro-Punic faction within the city. Carthage, especially Hannibal, 
regarded the event not only as a transgression of the Treaty of Ebro, but also as a 
direct intervention to the Carthaginian sphere of influence, and a threat to undermine 
the Carthaginian presence in Spain. In protest Hannibal demanded the surrender of 
the city before laying siege to it in 219 BC. However, since the Roman consuls were 
busy fighting in Illyria, and a new Gallic war on the horizon, the Romans failed to, 
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or neglected the requests of the Saguntines thereby leaving the city to its fate. 
Hannibal captured the city in 218 BC thereby triggering a chain of diplomatic 
exchanges that led to the mutual declaration of war between Rome and Carthage. In 
addition, Goldsworthy (2000) argues that another major cause of the war was the 
enmity and antagonistic perceptions of the House of Barca towards Rome. 
Goldsworthy (2000) states that Hamilcar Barca sought a revanchist war in the 
ensuing years after the First Punic War and had deliberately used Spain as a military 
base to revitalize Carthaginian land power. Therefore, it is argued that it was not the 
Carthaginian desire but the ambition of the Barcid faction had influenced the 
escalation. In addition Hoyos (2003) claims that it was Hamilcar Barca who had 
devised the offensive plan which Hannibal executed, and had intentionally aimed to 
build up a strong land army comprised of battle hardened infantry and flexible 
cavalry, thus Hannibal followed his father’s legacy.  
 
 
2.5. General Strategic Overview of the Second Punic War 
 
The Second Punic War (218 – 201 BC) was a long-lasting armed conflict 
between the Roman Republic and its allies, and the Carthaginian Republic and its 
allies around the Mediterranean Sea covering Spain, southern France, Italy, Sicily, 
Illyria, and North Africa. From the Roman perspective, the war had erupted due to 
the Carthaginian militaristic and antagonistic rise in the western Mediterranean, and 
the Roman desire to diminish the Carthaginian ascendancy which posed to be a 
possible threat to the Roman and their allies’ interests in the region. On the other 
hand, Carthage also opted for or at least expected a revanchist war that would alter 
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the Roman political supremacy and weaken the Roman naval and military power 
thereby re-elevating the Carthaginian strategic position in the Mediterranean.  
There were three stages in the war: the first stage (218 – 216 BC), featured 
the superiority of Carthage and Hannibal’s successful execution of an offensive war 
and Rome’s inability to put up an effective defense. The Carthaginian general 
managed to take a land army across the Pyrenees and the Alps, and won a series of 
stunning victories at the pitched battles of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae, 
which greatly disrupted the Roman military strength. Through such victories, the 
Carthaginians transmitted their military successes to the political arena and managed 
to partially crack the Roman – Italian Confederation at the south end of the 
peninsula. Although northern and central Italy stood loyal to the Romans, various 
Italian and Greek settlements of the south switched sides in the war; Hannibal to 
some extent, reached his aim of reducing Rome’s power over their allies, and then 
followed the opportunity of forming a Carthaginian sphere of influence in southern 
Italy. 
 
The second stage (215 – 207) witnessed not only the enlargement of the 
battle zones but also presented a transformation of the war into an all-out attrition 
warfare with war on multiple fronts. In other words, Rome, instead of directly 
engaging Hannibal at large pitched battles in Italy, prioritized to fight against 
Carthage’s allies in Italy, Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Illyria, thereby, aiming to 
prevent Hannibal to reinforce his army reinforce his army, and to weaken the Punic 
state by forcing it to divide their forces to multiple fronts. For this purpose, the 
Second Punic War expanded into Spain, Sicily, and Illyria, where, not only the 
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Carthaginians warred, but also the Macedonians, the Syracusans, and the Celt-
Iberians battled against the Roman forces. Syracuse, the Carthaginian ally in Sicily 
fell to the Romans in 211 BC, but the Carthaginians were successful in repelling the 
first Roman expedition to Spain, thereby securing their status in the west. However, 
Rome pressed on and a few years later their second expedition to Spain managed to 
capture the main Carthaginian base Cartago Nova and by 208 BC, the Romans had 
tilted the course of the war in the western front.   
 
On the east, the war on the Italian front was still inconclusive; however 
Hannibal still held the upper hand in the pitched battles and proved himself 
unbeatable in direct confrontations. During this eight year period, while Hannibal 
desperately sought to persuade other major south Italian cities and find a suitable 
harbor to get reinforcements, the Romans were successful in recapturing some of the 
major settlements (Capua, Arpi, and Tarentum) which Hannibal failed to protect. 
Perhaps, the most notable event of this period was the Battle of Metaurus River, 
where the brother of Hannibal, who had managed to take an army from Spain to 
Italy through the Alps, was defeated by the Romans thereby preventing Hannibal’s 
plan of regaining the initiative in his Italian Campaign. 
 
The final phase of war (207 – 201 BC) was marked by the end of Hannibal’s 
campaign in Italy, the amphibious landing of the Roman forces in North Africa, and 
the final battles that took place around the city of Carthage.  Rome’s immense 
pressure upon different fronts had forced Carthage to employ a purely defensive 
strategy aiming to preserve its territories from further Roman operations. On the 
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other hand the Romans, who had now acquired the absolute initiative and mobilized 
most of its able population,  defeated the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain and 
by 204 BC, had acquired a position to threaten the city of Carthage. Hannibal, 
although undefeated on numerous pitched battles in Italy, was called back by the 
Carthaginian government to take place in the defensive African campaign, while the 
Romans conducted their military operations. Hannibal lost the pitched battle of 
Zama in 202 BC thereby prompting Carthage to sue for peace. Therefore, after a 
long conflict that lasted for 17 years, and with the Carthaginian forces defeated 
nearly in every front, Rome once more emerged as the victorious and the superior 
power of the Mediterranean region. 
 
Consequently it is possible to state that both Carthage and Rome, throughout 
the different phases of the war, had used both offensive and defensive military 
strategies in the Second Punic War. For instance if their battles and confrontations 
are observed, it is evident that throughout the war both states have used offense in 
their battles overseas, and defense to guard their home or allied territories. The 
reluctance of the central Italian settlements, and the major Latin cities to join 
Hannibal created the break point of the war. If Hannibal’s initial plan of completely 
breaking up of the Roman alliance system after winning pitched battles had been 
successful, the prolongation or the extension of the war would be abated and Rome 
would have sued for peace. However, Rome’s allies stood firm and the turning of 
the conflict into a war of attrition enabled Rome to effectively mobilize its vast 
resources of manpower, ships, and logistics, gradually acquire the upper hand 
against the forces of Carthage.  
 25 
 
 
2.6. Roman and Carthaginian Strategies at the Beginning of the Second Punic 
War 
 
As all states of the past and present, before the initiation of the war, the 
Carthaginian Republic, and the Roman Republic had shaped a particular main 
(grand) strategy, and subsequent operational war strategies to be followed in the 
war. Grand strategy, or simply main strategy, can be denoted as the “ultimate 
objective” of a state, in which a country not only uses its military arm but also its 
“economic, diplomatic, social, and political instruments” to attain a general 
particular goal (Biddle, 2007).  Examples of grand strategy can be given as the aim 
of becoming a regional power, or preventing the rise of a rival state (Biddle, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, military strategies can be defined as the set of military 
and operational procedures that are followed to obtain a particular objective which is 
shaped within and for the purpose of implementing the grand strategy (Hart, 2002). 
Military strategies are generally constructed by the general staff or the main 
commanders of war who envision conducting military operations to defeat the 
enemy either in an offensive or a defensive way (Clausewitz, 1976). Examples to the 
military strategy can be given as all-out offense, attrition warfare, or active defense. 
In conjunction with the abovementioned concepts and with the available historical 
analysis, it is possible to define the Carthaginian and Roman grand and military 
strategies in the Second Punic War and figure out under what circumstances or 
conditions had prompted them to choose such policies. 
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2.6.1. Carthaginian Grand Strategy in the Second Punic War 
 
The arguments within the literature that focus upon the main strategy of the 
Carthaginians in the Second Punic War are diverse, and it is also difficult to 
distinguish the main strategy of Hannibal as a commander, and the main strategy of 
Carthage as a state. The literature uses both Hannibal and Carthage inter-
connectively; therefore there will not be a distinction here. In the literary sources, it 
is found that the main strategy of Carthage, or of Hannibal, is spread under four 
distinct categories; these are the destruction of Rome, reduction of the political and 
military power of Rome, capturing particular territories or establishing a 
Carthaginian sphere of influence in southern Italy, and lastly, forcing Rome to sign a 
peace treaty that would be beneficial or suitable for Carthaginian political 
aspirations.  
Regarding the Carthaginian grand strategy of destroying Rome, Africa 
(1974), Dudley (1962), Diakov and Kovalev (2008), and Gabriel (2011) argue that 
Hannibal’s main strategy was the destruction of Rome as a political entity.  In this 
regard, Africa (1974) states that through an offensive campaign with the Celts of the 
Po Valley, Hannibal aimed to “destroy” Rome and completely break the Italian 
Confederation. Diakov and Kovalev (2008) argue that he only intended to destroy 
the existence of the Roman Confederation, not the Roman Republic as a political 
entity. On the other hand, Dudley (1962) differs from the two previously mentioned 
scholars and proposes that Hannibal intended to destroy Rome only after uniting the 
enemies of Rome, such as Syracuse and Macedon; but did not plan to do so at the 
beginning of his campaign. Gabriel (2011), approaches from a naval stand point and 
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states that Hannibal actually did possess the destruction of Rome as a strategy. By 
building up his argument on the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet to Pisa in 217 BC, he 
argues that Hannibal intended to link the Carthaginian land and naval forces in Italy, 
thereby possessing the ability to besiege the city of Rome, while the Punic fleet 
intercepted the Roman troop transportations to aid the city defenses of Rome 
(Gabriel 2011: 70). Livy (1972: 79) argues that, apart from recovering Sicily and 
Sardinia, Hannibal’s main objective had a larger element, the destruction of Rome 
and the “expulsion of Romans from Italy”.  
 
There are also scholars who argue that Hannibal’s or Carthage’s main 
strategy was not the total destruction of Rome; but rather the reduction of Roman 
political and military power in the peninsula by confining its mere existence in 
central Italy. These historians base their claims upon the treaty of Hannibal and 
Philip V of Macedon and the practical impossibility of completely destroying Rome 
as a political entity by means available to Hannibal at that time (Grant 1978; 
Christiansen 1995; Inguanzo 1991; Hoyos 2010)  Regarding this strategy Sanford 
(1951), argues that by an offensive land campaign and by detaching Rome’s allies 
from the Italian Confederation, Hannibal had in mind to limit the “Roman power 
only in central Italy” (Sanford 1951: 342). Boak (1950) follows a similar argument 
with Sanford (1951) and state that Hannibal’s main objective was to greatly reduce 
the position of Rome in Italy and limit its holdings and territories to the ones of the 
early Roman Republic. In parallel, Scullard (1991), and Spaulding and Nickerson 
(1994), state that Hannibal, by breaking the integrity of the Roman – Italian 
Confederation, intended to damage the power of Rome beyond recovery, thereby 
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diminishing its political position in Italy.  In conjunction with the pervious scholars, 
Connolly (1998) states that Hannibal’s main strategy was isolation, where, the 
Roman political power in Italy would be greatly reduced and would be separated 
from its Italian Confederation.  
 
The third group of scholars argue that Hannibal, or Carthage’s main strategy 
was to recover the lost territories of the First Punic War, such as Sicily or Sardinia, 
and to establish a Carthaginian sphere of influence in southern Italy.  Their main 
claim was that the Second Punic War was a war of revenge in which Carthage, 
through an invasion of Italy, and later the amphibious operations in the central 
Mediterranean islands, was seeking to regain its lost Mediterranean empire and its 
political sphere of influence over Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Aegates 
(Sanford, 1951; Dudley, 1962; Hoyos, 2003; Hoyos, 2010; Peddie, 2005).  
Regarding Hannibal’s grand strategy Sanford (1951) argues that Hannibal, rather 
than opting for capturing the city of Rome, sought to pursue victory through a 
renewed war, would open the opportunity for Carthage to regain the strategic 
Mediterranean islands and to establish a “Carthaginian protectorate” in southern 
Italy. Parallel with Sanford, Dudley (1962) also states that a successful campaign 
would not only reduce the power of Rome in Italy but also provide the reacquisition 
of Sicily to Carthage. Hoyos (2003) claim that Carthage’s aim was not the total 
destruction of Rome nor even reducing its power status in Italy; on the contrast, the 
grand strategy of Carthage was mainly to regain Sicily, and to reestablish the 
Carthaginian sphere of influence in the western and central Mediterranean regions. 
Peddie (2005), similar to Hoyos (2010) also states that Carthage’s grand strategy 
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was imperialistic, and the Punic state was seeking to take back Sicily into its 
possessions, and to reinstate its empire again.  
 
 Probably the most widely accepted grand strategy of Hannibal f conducting a 
war, where the combined Carthaginian military, political, and economic instruments 
would force the Roman Republic to accept humiliating terms or sign a peace treaty 
which would favor Carthaginian political interests. The scholars that stand for this 
last category argue that rather than conquering or destroying the territories of Rome, 
Hannibal had in mind to pursue a military campaign which would create such a 
desperate situation for Rome that after realizing its military and political power in 
Italy has been greatly damaged and its alliance system has been largely 
disintegrated, Rome would seek peace and be forced to accept terms beneficial to 
the Carthaginian political and economic interests (Myres, 1950; Fronda, 2010; 
Groag, 1929; Lazenby, 1978; Lancel, 1996 Montgomery, 2000; Fuller, 1987; 
Mommsen, 1996; Briscoe, 1989; Demircioğlu, 2011; Chandler, 1994; Cornell and 
Matthews, 1988). 
 
For instance, Groag (1929: 124) argues that Carthage, by defeating the 
Romans in the Second Punic War, had envisioned forcing a peace treaty that would 
establish a “balance of power” between the two powers. Montgomery (2000) claims 
that Carthage’s main aim was to intimidate Rome accept the strong Carthaginian 
presence in the central Mediterranean region, and compel the Roman Republic to 
“peacefully coexist” with Carthage. Briscoe (1989: 72) looks from a wider 
perspective and claims that Carthage’s main strategy was to force Rome accept a 
“peace settlement” that would not only grant the Carthaginians a political presence 
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in Sicily and Sardinia, but would also prevent Rome to challenge Carthage in a 
future war. Fronda (2010), in parallel with Briscoe (1989) states that Hannibal’s 
strategy was to defeat Rome in the military arena so that the Roman Republic would 
sue for peace and, after the negotiations, would be forced to accept favorable terms 
for Carthage. 
 
 
2.6.2. Roman Grand Strategy in the Second Punic War 
 
In essence, the Roman grand strategy in the Second Punic War was similar to 
Carthage’s (Goldsworthy, 2000). The Romans opted to force a humiliating peace 
treaty so that through its terms it would not only make Carthage weak in political, 
military, and economic senses, but would also prevent Carthage to challenge the 
Roman power again or ever rise up to disrupt the status quo situation in the 
Mediterranean (Sanford 1951; Briscoe,1989; Scullard,1991). The execution of this 
intended Roman grand strategy is evident in its final peace treaty with Carthage, 
which was signed at the end of the Second Punic War in 201 BC. The terms directly 
define what the Romans exactly wanted; the total weakening of the Carthaginian 
state.  To minimize the Carthaginian power, the treaty prevented the Punic state to 
hold on to its overseas territories and regions it indirectly controlled in Africa and 
Spain (Mommsen, 1996). In militaristic sense, to prevent the eruption of a future 
conflict, the Romans limited the size of the Carthaginian navy and land forces to a 
small number of troops.  And to further diminish the Carthaginian political 
authority, the terms prohibited Carthage to declare war on any nation without 
consulting the Romans. Hence, through the terms of the treaty, it can be understood 
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that the Romans wanted Carthage to be a “client state”, where the Punic state’s 
authority was to be greatly reduced (Scullard, 1991: 238).   
 
In parallel, Bernstein (1994) argues that the grand strategy of Rome was 
based upon the notion of preventive war. By linking his argument with the Roman 
operations in Spain and Sicily at the beginning of the war, Bernstein claims that that 
through those overseas operations, Rome had envisioned to prevent the opportunity 
for Carthage to use both regions to attack any Roman territories in the future years 
to come (Bernstein 1994: 56). Similar to Bernstein (1994), Steinby (2004) also 
states that Rome’s grand strategy was both offensive and preventive in its essence; 
thereby the Republic opted to end the war in such a way that it would eliminate 
Carthage to be a threat in the future, and intimidate the Carthaginian government to 
accept one-sided terms that would reduce the Carthaginian political, economic, and 
military status in the Mediterranean region.  
 
2.7. Carthaginian and Roman Military Strategies at the Outset of the Second 
Punic War 
 
Both Carthage and Rome had envisaged a particular military strategy that 
complemented their grand strategies; however the ensuing events and the changes in 
the nature of the war prompted both nations to alter their military strategies as the 
war progressed. With the initiation of the war, since Carthage was following a war 
of recovery and sought to challenge the Roman position after the First Punic War, 
was pursuing an offense – oriented military strategy in which Hannibal would take 
the initiative and bring the war to Italy so that the Carthaginians could interrupt the 
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Roman pre-war plans, force the Romans to employ a hasty defense, disrupt the 
integrity of the Roman – Italian alliance system in the peninsula, and end the war 
with a quick victory (Bernstein 1982; Briscoe, 1994). Though, as the Romans 
survived the initial attack of the Carthaginians and pressed forward in their overseas 
campaigns such as in Spain or Sicily, after 215 BC, Carthage switched from its 
initial offense-oriented strategy to a more balanced approach where they could more 
easily sustain the war of attrition and also cope with the increasing Roman 
operations (Jones, 1988). 
 
Rome, similar to Carthage had also initially sought to pursue an offense-
oriented strategy that targeted the Punic territories of Spain and North Africa. 
However, after realizing a change of military matters in the summer of 218 BC, the 
Romans had to switch from their initial offensive military strategy to a defense-
oriented course of action that included a limited offensive element, and prioritized 
the defense of Italy against Hannibal’s army (Jones, 1988). This secondary Roman 
defense oriented strategy was employed in the form of an area defense where the 
Roman consular armies, through counter attacks and ambitious operations, aimed to 
prevent Hannibal’s movements in Italy. However, even though Rome’s defense – 
oriented strategy was mainly implemented in Italy, where Hannibal posed a larger 
threat; in other fronts such as Spain, Sicily, and Africa, the Romans still pursued 
their initial offense – oriented strategy which included concentration of forces, 
amphibious operations, sieges, and field battles; thereby combining offense and 
defense (Cary and Scullard, 1976). Therefore, in more clear terms, the Romans 
employed a balanced military strategy that combined both offense and defense, but 
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throughout the first two years of the war, the Romans favored to rely more on 
defense rather than offense Italy, and pursued an offensive element in the other 
fronts. 
 
 
2.7.1. Carthaginian (Hannibal’s) Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second 
Punic War 
 
In accordance with the Carthaginian Senate, Hannibal, as the commander in 
chief of the Carthaginian Armed Forces, had the mission to devise and execute a 
military strategy. Regarding various strategic, economic, political, and operational 
factors he chose to employ an offense-oriented military strategy that envisioned a 
major offensive operation that targeted Roman territories and a minor defensive 
measure taken in Punic Spain and North Africa (Livy, 1972; Polybius, 1984; Miles, 
2010). Such a military strategy consisted of an operation to Italy where the 
Carthaginian army would strike the heartland of the Romans; divert the conflict 
away from Carthaginian territories, and define the Italian peninsula as the war’s 
main and sole battle theater (Dodge, 1994). On the other hand, the minor defensive 
element of Hannibal’s strategy, was not only established to protect the Carthaginian 
territories against a surprise attack of the Romans; but also to provide garrison units 
to prevent any internal uprising that would endanger the Carthaginian position while 
it was at war with the Romans (Dodge, 1994). 
 
2.7.1.1. Hannibal’s Intention to Attack 
 
When compared to staying on the defensive or employing limited offensives 
towards certain strategic locations, there were several significant reasons for 
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Hannibal to choose an all-out offensive attack strategy. This decision to attack was 
firstly shaped under his intention to hold the complete initiative in the war, and then 
to strike the enemy heartland in Italy, or the Roman center of gravity, so to disrupt 
the integrity of the Roman political alliance system and thereby end the war with a 
quick campaign. The second reason which affected his decision to choose an 
offensive strategy was his incapacity in material and manpower that would force the 
Romans into a war of attrition; where, there would be multiple fronts, battle zones, 
and long conflict durations that would put an immense constrain on the Carthaginian 
war effort. Lastly, his reluctance to follow a rigid defensive warfare in which the 
Romans would have the complete initiative in the military operations towards the 
Carthaginian territories defined the final factor which prompted Hannibal to adopt 
an offensive campaign. 
 
Hannibal’s decision to follow an attack strategy that targeted the Roman 
heartland was said to be envisaged by his father, Hamilcar Barca, who had observed 
in the First Punic War that the Carthaginians were mainly passive, had reacted in a 
defense-oriented manner, were incapable in acquiring the initiative in the war, gave 
opportunities for Rome to strike at critical strategic places, and when compared with 
the Romans, were inferior in material and manpower in their war of attrition 
(Goldsworthy, 2000). Hannibal, probably taking into consideration his father’s 
experiences in the previous war had realized that the Carthaginians had not only 
failed to strike the core of the enemy; but also did not press to achieve a decisive 
result that would end the war in favor of Carthage. In addition, Carthage’s passive 
approach had led to the prolongation of the war in which Rome extracted more 
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resources from its allies and proved it capable to launch multiple offensives even to 
Carthage itself. Hence, regarding the instances of the First Punic War, Hannibal 
chose to pursue an all-out offensive military strategy that would give him the 
initiative, enable him to strike the Roman center of gravity, force Rome to a 
defensive position, and end the war in a decisive campaign (Goldsworthy, 2002). 
Regarding Hannibal’s offensive choice that targeted the Italian heartland, Chandler 
(1994) argues that Hannibal not only aimed to alter the outcomes of the First Punic 
War, where the Romans had acquired a great naval advantage by Sicily and later on 
in Corsica and Sardinia that elevated them to a position of being both a land and a 
naval power; but also must have thought that leaving the offense initiative to the 
Romans in the second war would not provide the opportunity to follow the objective 
of reversing the consequences of the previous war. According to Chandler (1994), 
Hannibal had predicted if the initiative would be left to the Romans, then they would 
attack with greater forces and would so immensely pressurize Hannibal in Spain and 
Carthage in Africa, and that the Second Punic War would be a repetition of the first 
and a disappointment for the Punic state. Hence, for Chandler (1994), Hannibal must 
have thought that it should be the Carthaginians who should strike first and follow 
an offense-oriented military strategy that would enable them to attack Italy and so 
that the initiative would lie in Hannibal’s hands.  
 
Approaching from a strategic perspective, Bernstein (1994) argues that 
Hannibal chose to employ an offense-oriented military strategy so that he could 
strike and destroy the Roman center of gravity in Italy, thereby knocking Rome out 
of the war with a decisive campaign. For Bernstein (1994), the fundamental reason 
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that triggered Hannibal to pursue such an objective was Hannibal’s belief that the 
real source of Roman military and material power was its alliance system, and 
therefore, if he could strike and defeat the Roman legions in the Italian heartland, 
then the Republic would be militarily so weakened that its alliance system would be 
nullified and an isolated Rome would sue for peace. Kuiper (2011) on the other 
hand, argues that Rome was militarily and economically too strong to be knocked 
out by an invasion of Hannibal and states that, the Carthaginian general not only 
knew this situation before the war but also pre-conceived that if he could reach the 
heartland of the peninsula by a bold strike and defeat the Roman legions in front of 
Rome’s allies in Italy, then the Roman weakness would be exposed and the various 
Italian communities within the Roman Confederation would be detached from the 
political supremacy of Rome thereby isolating the Roman Republic on its war with 
Carthage (Kuiper,2011).   
 
Lazenby (1973) approaches from a broader perspective and argues that 
Hannibal had in mind a certain strategic decision that prompted him to implement an 
offensive strategy; and further claims that the primary factor which affected 
Hannibal was to not to repeat the mistakes of the first war and divert the battle zones 
from the Carthaginian territories to Italy, thereby disrupting Roman military 
calculations and forcing the Romans to abort their offensive operations. In addition, 
Lazenby (1973) reveals that the decision to attack Italy was a reflection of 
Hannibal’s own perception regarding the military strength of Rome, and argues that 
Hannibal had long perceived that the Roman – Italian Confederation was actually 
Rome’s greatest weakness; and he believed that since the communities who lived 
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under the umbrella of the Roman Republic actually felt resentment, jealousy, and 
hatred towards Rome, if he could defeat the Roman forces within the sight of those 
communities, then those population would switch sides and Rome would be 
politically and militarily isolated. Mommsen (1996) also emphasizes on the 
importance of striking the enemy heartland and states that Hannibal chose not to be 
entangled in proxy wars in Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and instead of advancing to 
capture or hold those periphery territories; he preferred to attack Italy itself where a 
quicker and a more significant result could be reached.  
 
 There are also diverse views among historians who argue that Hannibal 
chose to employ an offense-oriented military strategy in order to prevent the 
occurrence of a long war of attrition (Fields, 2010; Hoyos, 2003; Lazenby, 1973). 
Regarding the notion, Fields (2010) states that Hamilcar Barca had fought in the 26 
year long First Punic War and had gravely experienced the tenacity of an attrition 
war; therefore it was Hannibal’s father who had warned his son to avoid any long 
lasting struggle with an enemy that has superior material and manpower resources. 
Fields (2010) also enlightens the point of statistics and claims that Hannibal chose to 
pre-emptively strike Rome and avoid the prolongation of the conflict on multiple 
fronts; because he knew that even though he himself had the superiority in command 
and tactics, the Romans had immense manpower reserves that, with numerous 
offensives, could easily bleed the Carthaginian army to death and inflict heavy 
casualties battle after battle.  
 
Parallel to Fields (2010), Hoyos (2003) also argues that Hannibal, to avoid a 
war of attrition, chose to pursue an offense-oriented war which would grant him a 
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greater initiative. According to Hoyos (2003), since Carthage had witnessed the 
extent of the Roman reserves, logistics, and troop capabilities in the First Punic War, 
Hannibal was aware of the dangers that the war of attrition would bring and 
therefore, chose to act swiftly and audaciously to take the conflict into Italy and 
finish the war with a quick campaign before it became a war in multiple fronts and 
span for a long time period.  Regarding Hannibal’s aversion of a war of attrition, 
Lazenby (1973), in line with Hoyos (2003), states that Hannibal chose to attack due 
to his decision that pursuing a war of attrition would only be the repetition of the 
First Punic War where a long, static, constant, and inconclusive warfare would 
repeatedly take place in Spain and Africa. In addition, due to the immense costs that 
the war of attrition brings upon states, Lazenby (1973) states that even though 
Carthage would won the war of attrition, they themselves would be so severely 
weakened after a long lasting conflict that the Carthaginians would be unable to 
follow up their victory with a decisive treaty. Hence to avoid such a clash where 
military production, logistics, and previously prepared economic and military 
capabilities would determine the outcome of the war, a quick offensive campaign in 
Italy under Hannibal would bring a greater decisive result. 
 
Apart from offense, Hannibal also had the option to stay on the defensive. 
However, probably for him such an approach to war was either risky or seemed 
costlier than crossing the Alps. Regarding this topic Daly (2002) and Connolly 
(1998) claims that Hannibal did not favor the defensive option; because there was 
the probability that the newly subdued Celt-Iberian tribes would switch sides in the 
war or could ally with the Romans against the Carthaginians in Spain. In other 
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words, both scholars argue that if Hannibal stood on the defensive, it would be the 
Romans who would disrupt the alliance system of the Carthaginians in Spain and 
then break the manpower source of Hannibal in the war. Therefore, according to 
Daly (2002) it seemed a better option for Hannibal to strike Italy with his troops and 
divert the war away from his own territories. Goldsworthy (2000), similarly states 
that a defensive warfare employed in Spain or Africa would not knock Rome out of 
the war; on the contrast, since Rome would now have the initiative, and with 
limitless resources extracting from its allies, the invading legions would even nullify 
Hannibal’s plan to force the Roman Senate to accept peacefully coexisting with 
Carthage. Hoyos (2003) argues that Hannibal, while staying on the defensive, had 
the capability to repel a Roman invasion force landing in Spain; however he would 
have the problem of protecting the city of Carthage in North Africa, which would be 
vulnerable to a blockade or a surprise amphibious force that would lay siege to the 
city. In addition, according to Hoyos (2003), apart from the problem of defending 
the North African province, staying on the defense would still not provide any 
advantage to Hannibal; since, although if he could defeat the incoming Roman 
armies, he would still have to take the initiative and bring the battle zone to the 
Roman provinces to press for a final result.  
 
 
2.7.2. Hannibal’s Choice of Land Attack 
 
At the outset of the Second Punic War, Hannibal’s Italian campaign is 
regarded as one of the most audacious military strategic moves made in history. 
Taking an intact and unified multi-national army comprised of Carthaginians, 
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Numidians, Celt-Iberians, Spaniards, and Gauls, across Europe’s two highest 
mountain ranges, over numerous rivers, swamplands, and forests, Hannibal had 
managed to descend into Italy after months of constant marching from Spain and 
France with a force still capable of fighting. Such a maneuver signifies how fully 
committed the Carthaginian general was and how he had pre-planned the entire 
journey to be taken. However, here arises the question of why Hannibal, or 
Carthage, a state well known for its maritime traditions, had not preferred to 
implement a naval attack or an amphibious assault, but took the harder and costlier 
route, that is, through the spring and summer months, to march approximately 
1500km from Spain to Italy. Though probably it is impossible to know the real 
answer for the aforementioned question, there are several plausible answers given 
by several historians that enlighten this obscurity. Their arguments over Hannibal’s 
land attack choice coincides over several issues; these are the Carthaginian 
inferiority in naval capacity and naval logistics, Roman superiority in vessel and 
ship numbers, the element of surprise in attacking by land, and Hannibal being a 
land general had probably affected the Carthaginian calculations in preferring to 
march by land rather than attacking by sea. 
 
 
2.7.2.1.   Naval Complications  
 
One of the primary reasons for Hannibal to neglect a direct amphibious naval 
assault towards Italy was due to the matters regarding naval complications. These 
can be sequenced as Carthage’s naval inferiority in launching a successful invasion, 
the lack of Carthaginian naval bases that would provide logistics to its navy, and the 
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Roman naval dominance in the central Mediterranean zone. To begin with, when 
compared with the capability of the Romans, Carthage had a relative inadequacy in 
naval power; such as, quantitative problems concerning ship, vessel, and crew 
numbers, material necessities, and the lack of building programs (Hoyos, 2003; 
Goldsworthy, 2000; Fields, 2010). Miles (2010) for instance argues that Hannibal 
had only 37 quinqueremes at the beginning of the war; however, at the disposal of 
the two consuls, the Romans had 3 times that number of war ships available to be 
launched directly towards the Carthaginian territories. Therefore it was implausible 
for Hannibal to launch a naval attack that would probably end with the destruction 
of his fleet (Miles, 2010: 154). Lazenby (1973) also compares the number of ships 
available to both states and argues that it was the numerical inferiority of the 
Carthaginians that affected Hannibal’s calculations; thereby, without the means of 
providing safely transportation of a large army, it was impractical for him to launch 
a direct naval attack. 
 
Fields (2010) on the other hand states that due to the weakness of the 
Carthaginian naval power present in Spain, Hannibal did not intend to launch a 
naval attack from his base at Cartago Nova. Fields (2010) supports his argument by 
stating that since Carthage was unable to effectively sustain the vessel losses of the 
First Punic War, their relative weakness in naval matters had affected the combat 
capacity of the Carthaginian navy in terms of quality, quantity, and morale; 
therefore this weakness had prompted Hannibal to look for alternative ways to 
transport his army into Italy. 
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Steinby (2004) approaches from a different direction and argues that after the 
First Punic War, Carthage deliberately did not construct a fleet that would challenge 
the Roman naval supremacy. Steinby (2004) states that, since the meaning of such a 
militaristic move would definitely provoke a pre-emptive strike by the Romans, and 
would defy the Carthaginian or Hannibal’s pre-war calculations, the Barcid faction 
neglected to pursue a comprehensive naval program. Therefore, according to 
Steinby (2004) Hannibal, as the commander in chief of the Carthaginian armies, did 
not intentionally pursue to bolster the efficacy of the Carthaginian fleet that would 
aggravate the Romans; on the contrast, he led the Romans into a sense of false 
security which would appease them until the Carthaginian land army was ready for a 
march. Similar to Steinby (2004), Cary & Scullard (1976) also argue that Hannibal, 
intentionally did not build a war fleet, specifically for such an ambitious amphibious 
operation; but rather, aimed at strengthening the land forces which would be 
reequipped, reinforced, and trained in central Spain, without the intervention of the 
Romans. However, such an opportunity was not available for their naval forces, 
since the Romans and their allies patrolled the seas, and would perceive such 
military drills as a possible threat to their security, they would preemptively 
intervene to the Carthaginian navy (Cary & Scullard, 1976). 
 
Regarding the naval complications which hindered Hannibal’s decision of 
naval attack, Salmon (1960) focuses upon the recuperation rate of the Carthaginian 
navy after the First Punic War, and argues that although the Carthaginians could 
obtain a regional naval superiority in the war, the Carthaginian overall naval 
capacity fails to grant Hannibal general naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea; 
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and therefore, fails to provide him the option of launching grand scale naval 
operations. In addition, Salmon (1960) claims that only when the Carthaginian war 
vessels were concentrated in a particular location or region, then it was able for the 
Carthaginians to implement limited offensives upon Roman coasts; otherwise, the 
Romans had the general naval superiority and had the strategic advantage in 
conducting grand scale naval operations. 
  
Parallel to Salmon (1960), Robinson (1977), approaches from a similar 
direction and argues that Hannibal did not intend a naval attack because when 
compared to the First Punic War, the Carthaginian navy was far from its military 
effectiveness, had problems regarding morale and leadership, and were numerically 
weaker than the Roman fleet. However according to Robson (1977) the most 
important factor that constrained Hannibal’s amphibious operation intention was 
logistics and the lack of transport ships, which would have to be occupied by 
thousands of soldiers, horses, and elephants, and the incapacity of the Carthaginian 
war fleet to escort the transport ships to the shores of Italy without being harmed or 
damaged.   
 
In addition, the problem of naval rallying points also dissuaded Hannibal in 
launching an amphibious attack. All fleets, regardless of their size, strength, or 
carrying capacity require a safe harbor to protect themselves against storms or 
enemy attacks, and to resupply for further operations. Such limitations affected the 
Carthaginians who, after the First Punic War, were deprived of their available naval 
rallying points, most notably the central Mediterranean Islands such as Sicily, 
Corsica, Sardinia, the beaches in southern France, and the north west Italy. Hence, it 
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was this operational limit of the Carthaginian navy that prevented Hannibal to 
transport his troops and war ships, and to embark on an amphibious assault on Italy.  
 
Regarding the operational range of the Carthaginian navy Goldsworthy 
(2002) argues that the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and other smaller central 
Mediterranean Islands confined the Carthaginian territorial waters to the west of the 
Balearic Islands, thus limiting their operational abilities towards the central and 
eastern Mediterranean zones. In addition, Goldsworthy (2000) clarifies that since the 
warships of the antiquity had small carrying capacities and even smaller areas to 
store provisions, the Carthaginian navy needed rallying points before they could 
embark on a large amphibious operation. However, since no Carthaginian landing 
zone east of the Balearic Islands existed, this meant that Hannibal’s fleet had to 
cross a huge distance without having the protection of a fortified harbor or a rallying 
point to resupply and obtain provisions. Hence, for Goldsworthy (2000) such 
significant logistical limitations prevented Hannibal to ponder upon a grand naval 
attack and it was simply unfeasible for the Carthaginian general to set out for a 
journey which would had a high likelihood of supply problems.   
 
In addition, Goldsworthy (2002) states that let alone operating from Spain 
towards Italy, even reaching the boot of the peninsula with an intact force seemed 
difficult for the Carthaginians who had lost Sicily and the other smaller central 
Mediterranean Islands; and even if they solved the problem of naval rallying points 
they still had to pass through the ever present Roman naval patrols or their large 
southern fleet under consul Longus. Parallel with Goldsworthy (2002), Fields (2010) 
analyzes the operational range and the carrying capacities of the oared ships of the 
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antiquity and argues that it was these supply problems to feed, reequip, and sustain a 
large land and naval force at sea prevented Hannibal to reconsider his though of a 
direct naval attack. 
  
Steinby (2004) looks from a wider naval standpoint and argues that since the 
vessels at that time generally followed the coastline and needed frequent intervals of 
resupply and shelter during their voyages, it was a necessity that the beaches or the 
coastal territories to be governed by their own state or by their allies. However, 
since the Romans controlled the Italian coast, Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, and the 
Roman-allied Massilians ruled the southern France, it was impossible for Hannibal 
to anchor freely at those territories, resupply his army, and take shelter in bad 
weather; hence, according to Steinby (2004), it was unreasonable to risk a large 
scale naval engagement without securing rallying points for the navy.  
  
Similarly, Lancel (1998) by stating that it was the operational limitations that 
hindered the Carthaginian fleet’s voyage from Spain to Italy that affected Hannibal’s 
calculations regarding a naval invasion; adds an atmospheric factor, the wind and 
the weather, as the primary natural element that created a risk for the Carthaginian 
navy which had no naval harbors to shelter beyond the Balearic Islands. Lancel 
(1998) thereby brings up the point that if the Carthaginian fleet encounters bad 
weather on its voyage, without the existence of a friendly harbor, there was even the 
possibility of total annihilation by giant waves or violent storms. As a consequence, 
the sea voyage presented too many precarious chances and risks to handle (Lancel, 
1998).  
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2.7.2.2. Roman Naval Dominance in the Mediterranean Sea 
 
Perhaps one of the most important factors that limited Hannibal to pursue a 
naval action towards Italy was due to the fact that the Romans possessed a far 
superior navy in terms of ship numbers, personnel, bases, and construction 
capacities.  Many historians who have looked at Hannibal’s military expedition to 
Italy have presented the fact that the main cause for Hannibal to choose the land 
route was because of his undesire to be dragged into a confrontation with the Roman 
navy, which would bar his way to Italy and destroy his transports and the escorting 
warships (Spaulding & Nickerson, 1994; Chandler, 1994; Bernstein 1994, Starr, 
1983; Bradford, 2000). The possibility of such a disaster probably dissuaded 
Hannibal who, by choosing the land route, aimed at preserving the unity of his army. 
Regarding Roman naval dominance Goldsworthy (2002), states that even though the 
Carthaginian fleet would be capable for implementing an amphibious operation on 
the shores of Italy, the Roman fleet would deny an easy landing place and would 
prove impossible for the Carthaginian to make a landing without large naval battle. 
Chandler (1994), emphasizes the efficacy of the Roman navy, and argues that the 
Roman fleets were relatively in better condition than the Carthaginian ones after the 
years following the First Punic War; hence, it was maintenance and materiel that 
provided Romans the advantage. Daly (2002), Steinby (2004), and Lancel (1998) 
argue that since ancient warships followed the coastline in their voyages, and the 
Romans not only controlled the coastline from Spain to Italy, but also the landing 
places near the shore, the Carthaginian fleet would be unable to make a coastline 
approach attempt feasible, where, they would be intercepted and be vulnerable 
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against attacks from both the land and from the sea. In parallel, Miles (2010), Fields 
(2010), Lazenby (1973), and Lancel (1998), describe the numerical disparities 
between the two navies and present that it was this quantitative superiority of the 
Roman war fleet which had played the main role in dissuading Hannibal to press for 
a naval attack approach. For instance, Miles (2010) argues that the Romans had 
three times more number of warships than their Carthaginian counterpart; whereas, 
Fields (2010) states that the Romans had twice the number of warships ready than 
the Carthaginian fleet.  
 
 
2.7.2.3. The Element of Surprise 
 
The other decisive factor delineated by various historians was the element of 
surprise that the land route granted Hannibal. Chandler (1994), Miles (2010), 
Steinby (2004), Connolly (1998), and Christiansen (1995) argue that Hannibal chose 
to take the land route and attack Italy via the Alps was because his intention was to 
make a surprise attack to the Romans by descending from the mountains at the north 
to the Po valley at the south. For instance Chandler (1994) and Connolly (1998) 
state that since the Romans were not only expecting that the Second Punic War 
would be in line with the first war, where Carthage had adopted a more defensive 
stance, but also due to possessing naval superiority, the Romans must have thought 
about possessing the absolute initiative on this second war, and did not consider the 
actual possibility of the advancement of a Carthaginian army marching through the 
Pyrenees and the Alps; therefore, they were surprised to see Hannibal who had 
outmaneuvered them. Steinby (2004) states the defensive weakness of the Romans 
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along their northern frontier, and argues that Hannibal, informed of such a 
disadvantaged troop deployment in northern Italy, and to circumvent Roman naval 
patrols, adopted to pursue a land attack aiming at reaching the Po Valley unopposed 
via the Alps.   
 
 
2.7.2.4. Hannibal’s Character as a Land General 
 
Other scholars such as Hoyos (2003), Sanford (1951), and Starr (1983) argue 
that it was Hannibal’s character as a land general affected his preferences 
concerning the negligence of the sea route. As it was evident during his records of 
being a land commander Hannibal had more experience in fighting land battles 
rather than naval engagements. Since his campaigns in central Spain required him to 
create various ambushes, stratagems, and maneuver tactics to be employed by a 
numerically inferior force against a superior one, it is possible that he had enhanced 
his talents on land battle tactics rather than commanding his troops in naval 
engagements or in amphibious operations.  
 
On this concept Sanford (1951) states that Hannibal chose to attack Rome by 
land, because rather than conducting naval engagements, he had superior knowledge 
regarding land battles and maneuver tactics, especially on the use of cavalry; and 
since Carthage could not build a navy so not to reveal its offensive ambitions to the 
enemy, Hannibal had built a strong land army that would be concealed from the 
enemy and fought under the leadership of his genius. Starr (1983) similarly, argues 
that since Hannibal had formed a strong land army comprised of a large cavalry and 
elephant force, and managed to combine a conglomeration of numerous ethnic 
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groups whom were specialized on fighting on land confrontations, he may have seen 
the probability that he had more chance of success in wining battles on land if he 
could take his huge army across the Alps and descend on Italy as an intact force. 
  
Hoyos (2003), and May, Stadler, & Votaw (1984) look from a broader 
perspective and claim that since Hannibal’s grand strategy required him to break the 
Roman Confederation in Italy by defeating the numerically superior Roman legions 
under the eyes of the Roman allies, instead of focusing on naval matters, the 
Carthaginian general needed to develop innovative tactics of maneuver, ambush, 
deployment, or land engagement so that he could accomplish his mission of 
effectively destroying Roman land armies and prompting defections of the other 
Italian societies by showing the weakness of the military arm of the Roman 
Republic. Hence, rather than aiming to confront the numerically superior Roman 
navy on the sea and risking an amphibious invasion, Hannibal, by basing on his 
training and learnings from his father and brother in law as land generals, focused on 
enhancing the fighting capability of his land army (Hoyos,2003). Furthermore since, 
training and building a naval force required more time and materials, Hannibal, 
selected to transport his veteran army by land rather than the sea (May, Stadler, and 
Votaw, 1984).  
 
 
2.7.2.5. Hannibal’s Gain-cost Analysis 
 
There are also arguments related to Hannibal’s calculations regarding risks 
and the costs of a naval invasion (Miles, 2010; Fields, 2010, Goldsworthy, 2000; 
Mommsen, 1996; Havell, 1960).  For instance Miles (2010) and Fields (2010) argue 
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that since Rome had a numerically superior fleet and held the central Mediterranean 
islands, a seaborne invasion seemed to be too risky for Hannibal to take; hence for 
the Carthaginian general, to circumvent the hazardous voyage and rather than 
staying on the defensive, the land attack option seemed to be the better alternative. 
Goldsworthy (2000) approaches from a different perspective and argues that, for the 
Carthaginian general, it must have been much hazardous to take the risk of being 
intercepted by the superior Roman navy than marching a long distance unnoticed on 
land. In addition, Goldsworthy (2000) also states that even if the Carthaginian land 
army had managed to bypass or stave off a Roman naval interception, as a result of 
combat losses, their force would be not likely to be in operational capacity in Italy.  
 
Connolly (1998) states that even though an amphibious landing operation 
seemed possible at Genoa than sailing directly to Italy, the huge convoy of 
Carthaginian fleet and its land army being transported would still pose a serious 
vulnerable target for the Roman navy. Hence, according to Connolly (1998), 
Hannibal must have calculated that rather than taking the risk of a naval disaster, 
reaching Italy via the land route seemed more likely, and there existed the option of 
evasion and concealment from the Roman forces. Mommsen (1996) argues that 
since the Gauls of the Po Valley had assured Hannibal that they would give support 
to the Carthaginian land forces in his Italian campaign, rather than taking the less 
calculable contingencies of the sea, it must have seemed to be a better option for 
Hannibal to choose the land attack option and arrive in Italy via the Alps.  
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Furthermore, Mommsen (1996) states that even though Hannibal must have 
considered that making a landing at Genoa seemed to shorten time and would spring 
him to his Italian objective, the Geonan Alps were much more difficult to cross, and 
there were much less passes available at the knowledge of his local guides. Le Glay, 
Voisin, Bohec & Cherry (2001), presents an unorthodox argument and claim that 
since Hannibal knew that the Romans were superior in naval affairs and held the 
advantage in intercepting his naval operation; therefore to outmaneuver, he instead 
opted an attack on Italy via the Alps, which would establish only a single land front, 
rather than a Mediterranean one with naval battles and amphibious operations. 
Havell (1996) and Salmon (1960) claim that it was due to Hannibal’s gain – cost 
calculations that determined his course of action in the war. Since several crucial 
factors such as the superiority of the Roman fleet, the problematic condition of the 
Carthaginian fleet, the islands being in control of the Romans, the and assurance of 
the Celts of the Po Valley prompted Hannibal to select to land attack and evade the 
hazards and risks of the sea; which would inevitably create more problems.  
 
 
2.7.2.6. The Celtic Factor 
 
Another critical reason for Hannibal to embark on a highly unusual 
preference of crossing the Alps is due to the promise given by the Celts of the Po 
Valley to Hannibal who assured to join with the Carthaginian general and allowed 
him to use their own territory as a temporary base for further operations. For 
instance Lazenby (1973) states that Hannibal wanted to take the long land route 
because he knew that Rome’s establishment of colonies in the Celtic territories had 
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created an uneasy political situation in the Cisalpine region, and such an opportunity 
would enable Celts to be eager to join his ranks and increase his fighting power 
potential in Italy. May, Stadler, & Votaw (1984) argue that Hannibal chose to 
implement a land attack via the Alps; because such a maneuver enabled him to 
provide a temporary base or a relief ground in the Cisalpine region, far from Roman 
intervention, and among the Celtic allies who had promised to aid the Carthaginian 
army.  
 
Scullard (1991), Boak (1951), Dudley (1962), and Sanford (1951) argue that 
Hannibal had in mind to sustain his losses of a land attack via the Alps by allying, 
concerting, and recruiting the Celts in the North Italian region who also were eager 
for a revanchist war against the Roman colonies established in the Po Valley, sought 
plunder and wealth under the military operations of the Carthaginian commander, 
and would be welcoming to provide valuable food and equipment for the weakened 
Carthaginian army. Fuller (1987) argues that the real reason behind Hannibal’s 
choice of land attack is not related to the Roman naval dominance of the 
Mediterranean; but rather, his aim to bring the Celts under his own banner, use their 
territories as recruiting grounds, and to establish a new supply base in Italy prior to 
the beginning of the military confrontations with the Romans. According to Fuller 
(1987) the naval attack option would not provide Hannibal the opportunity to link up 
with the Celts, and would not provide him the chance to set up a secure and 
temporary base in Italy. Since Hannibal had to find a suitable resting place after his 
descent from the Alps, the Po Valley was the only available area to recuperate 
without direct Roman intervention. 
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2.7.2.7. The Defensive Element of Hannibal’s Military Strategy 
 
Though, in conjunction with the assault strategy, with the intention of 
protecting his rear base and the territories of Carthage, Hannibal’s offense-oriented 
strategy also included a minor defensive element. Such a measure consisted of  
deployment of a formidable rear guard in Spain and Africa which would prevent any 
uprising of the recently the subdued tribes of Spain, hinder a probable surprise 
invasion force of the Romans in Africa, and in the later phases of the war, move 
forward as reinforcement armies for Hannibal’s offensive operations (Livy, 1972). 
Both Livy (1972) and Polybius (1984) give much detailed figures regarding 
Hannibal’s defensive measures. Nevertheless, although such defensive procedures 
were taken to protect the territorial integrity of Carthage, Hannibal’s main military 
strategy was the execution of a land offense. For that purpose, rather than setting up 
defensive positions, he had long made preparations to take his army and attack the 
territories of the Romans in Italy. 
 
2.8. Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second Punic War 
 
Although there are numerous books about the tactics (Wise and Hook, 1982; 
Keppie, 2005), organization (Sekunda and Northwood, 1995), deployment (Mcnab, 
2010), command structure (Fields, 2010), or logistics (Roth, 1999) of the Roman 
army of the mid-Republic, the strategic aspect of the Roman military is observed to 
be generally neglected and it is not adequately possible to determine an exact 
conceptualization of the Roman military strategy in its wars with the Carthaginians. 
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The Romans did not possess a general staff or did not feel the necessity to explain 
why they have chosen that particular military strategy in their wars; for instance 
Livy (1972) or Polybius (1984) do not provide an analytical or an investigative 
explanation for the military strategic events but prefer for a more descriptive 
discourse aiming to portray the events as it happened in the past (Wheeler, 1993). 
Therefore, the following conceptualization of the Roman military strategy in the 
Second Punic War is my own interpretation, and is deliberated through my 
understanding of the strategic interactions between 218 – 216 BC.    At the outset 
(spring 218 BC) of the Second Punic War, the Romans, similar to the Carthaginians, 
had planned to adopt an offense-dominant approach, where, by making use of their 
naval superiority, alliance systems, and vast manpower resources, hoped to hold the 
absolute initiative in the war, implement several amphibious military operations, and 
aimed to strike the Carthaginian centers of gravity (Spain and North Africa); so that 
they could compel the Punic state to sue for peace, and reinstate Rome as the 
absolute dominant power of the Mediterranean (Rollin, 1992; Boak, 1950; Starr, 
1971; Grant, 1978).  
 
However, with the beginning of the war, and with the Roman realization of 
Hannibal’s main intentions in the summer of 218 BC, the Romans altered their 
offense-dominant military strategy and turned to adopt a more balanced approach or 
a more defense-oriented doctrine where they not only prioritized defending their 
homeland Italy against Hannibal’s audacious land attack, but also gave importance 
to limited offensive operations such as supporting a limited overseas expedition. 
This altered Roman military strategy in the mid 218 BC, called for a partial limited 
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offensive action in the outer seas campaigns and a defensive approach in Italy; 
where primarily, the Roman armies would prevent Hannibal’s recuperation after his 
long Alpine journey, thwart a Celtic – Carthaginian military convergence, and 
employ an aggressive defense based on counter attacks to defeat Hannibal’s 
numerically inferior army in Italy (Bagnall, 2002). In other words, by decisively 
defeating his weary army in the Po valley and operating in the outer seas to disrupt 
Hannibal’s line of communications, the Romans aimed to acquire the initiative from 
Hannibal and prevent him to accomplish his war aims and Carthaginian grand 
designs.  
 
Therefore, I argue that since this altered military plan combined both offense 
and defense, it can be stated that this operational Roman military strategy was in line 
with the modern military term “active Defense” or “aggressive defense”, which is 
generally implemented through the following methods: (1) application of an area 
defense which would protect the political, economic, and military centers of the 
state, (2) having strong intolerance towards losing territories and valuable ground, 
and (3) employing an aggressive defensive doctrine, which prioritizes counter-
attacks to capture the initiative in the war and then create opportunities for 
annihilating an advancing enemy army within a specific region (Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2001).2 
                                                 
2 There is no exact definition of Active Defense in the military terminology; however in its essence, 
various active defense definitions specifically mention its aggressive nature and the importance of 
counterattacking.  For instance, in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (2001: 4), it is stated that active defense corresponds to the “employment of limited offensive 
action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or the position to the enemy”. Meanwhile in the 
Dictionary of Modern War (Luttwak and Koehl, 1991: 11), active defense is stated as a “defensive 
operational method based upon the combination of a flexible resistance (to slow, weaken, and 
eventually halt enemy attacks) with localized counterattacks meant to throw the enemy off balance 
and eventually force his retreat”.  
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2.8.1. Initial Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the Second Punic War  
 
According to Livy (1972: 41) and Polybius (1984: 214) the Romans’ initially 
planned military strategy was the following: one consular army would be deployed 
in Sicily, which would make preparations for a descent on North Africa and then 
threaten or blockade the Carthaginian government with an amphibious operation; 
while the other consular army, which was destined for Spain, would track Hannibal 
down in the west, and prevent him from launching any military operation towards 
Italy or any other Roman territory (Goldsworthy, 2000: 151).  According to Myres 
(1950), Briscoe (1982), Robinson (1977), and Mommsen (1996), the Romans 
adopted such an offense minded course of action because they did not give credit to 
the Carthaginians or to Hannibal who might make a daring action from Spain, 
challenging the Romans navies, or launching an invasion of Italy through the Alps. 
They also expected that this second Roman - Carthaginian war would be in similar 
to the first where the Carthaginians would again stay in the defensive, and they 
themselves would hold the initiative (Goldsworthy, 2000). According to Rollin 
(1992), confident of their offensive capabilities, the Romans wanted to completely 
carry the war into Spain and Africa, and had made preparations that would provide 
them to have the absolute supremacy in their operations. 
  
Another significant element within this initial offense dominant Roman 
military strategy was the force deployed in northern Italy, which was stationed under 
a Praetor to check the rebellious Celts living in that area and guard the northern 
frontier (Livy, 1972: 40). Due to the fact that the Romans, after pacifying their 
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Cisalpine frontier had established two colonies in the Po valley, Placentia and 
Cremona, they seemed to find necessary to take defensive measure that would not 
only suppress the resented Celts living in that area, but would also intervene or stop 
any unexpected event coming through the Alps. Spaulding and Nickerson (1994) 
argue that the army stationed in the north was also expecting a Celtic revolt sparked 
by the Carthaginian agents present there; hence the army was in full alert. In 
addition, when this northern Roman force was ambushed by the Celts before 
Hannibal crossed the Rhone, a large unit from one of the consular armies was 
detached and stationed under the Praetor as a reserve force.  
 
 
2.8.2. The Altered Roman Military Strategy at the Outset of the War 
 
Even though Rome had designed an offensive military strategy, new events 
in the initial months of the war would prompt Rome to switch to a more defense 
dominant approach. In the summer of 218 BC, when the consular army under 
Cornelius Scipio collided with Hannibal’s cavalry at the river Rhone, the Roman 
consul fully realized that the main aim of the Carthaginian general was directly 
towards invading Italy (Lancel, 1998). He deployed his army against a possible 
clash, but being unable to force Hannibal into battle, he unwillingly allowed the 
Carthaginians to disappear within the Alps. Afterwards it is observable that, the 
consul Scipio, without consulting to the Senate or the Roman government in power, 
deliberately made a slight alteration to the Roman initial war plan and rather than 
conducting a direct offensive expedition to Spain, the base of Hannibal, he chose to 
employ an active defense strategy in which he could combine both offense and 
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defense in this northern land campaign. With this alteration, Scipio prioritized the 
defense of Italy where only a small force under the command of Praetor Manlius 
guarded the northern frontier; and therefore with a small contingent, he set sail back 
to Pisa, planning to hold the Po Valley and to implement a more effective defensive 
element to prevent Hannibal overrun Italy. In addition, as a counter-attack measure, 
he also dispatched one part of his forces towards Spain, aiming to cut Hannibal’s 
line of communications and cut his way of getting reinforcements (Bradford, 2000). 
 
After Scipio’s return to Italy, the Roman government approved his strategic 
alterations and taking into consideration the weakness of their troop deployment in 
northern Italy, ordered the other consul, Sempronius Longus, to abort his African 
mission, join Scipio in his defensive war in the north, and together defeat the 
Carthaginian general along the river Po (Livy, 1972: 77). The Romans also feared 
and wanted to defend against the uprising of the Boii and the Insubres tribes 
(Cisalpine Gauls), who were looking for an opportunity to step out from the Roman 
sphere of influence. Thus, the Senate and the Roman government in power seemed 
to have favored an active defense strategy; by ordering its southern legions to join 
the campaign in the north and cancelling its major offensive operation towards 
Africa, it can be seen that the Romans not only have altered their offensive strategy 
towards a more defensive one but also did not chose to employ a passive defense 
either. Myres (1950) and Mommsen (1996) argues that considering the rebellious 
and hostile position of the Celts living in that area, and the lack of logistical support 
to men guarding the passes, the Romans did not consider occupying the passages of 
the Alps, and therefore, did not employ a static defense along the mountains.  
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Mommsen (1996), by examining the Battle of Ticinus and the subsequent 
events in northern Italy argues that Rome chose to employ a defense with an 
aggressive nature so that the enemy would be confined to the Cisalpine region, its 
advance to meet up with the Celts would be hindered, and the spreading of the war 
to the allies, peoples, and the territories of the Republic would be prevented. 
Connolly (1998) states that Scipio, after losing the Battle of Ticinus, feared that 
Hannibal, with his speed and superior cavalry, might bypass the Roman strongpoints 
on the Po and enter into the core of Italy; therefore intended to employ a  more 
mobile and aggressive defensive approach, rather than staying in a static defensive 
position near that river.  
 
The decisions of the Roman Senate in the late months of 218 BC shows the 
defensive doctrine of the Romans; for instance before the Battle of Trebia, the 
Romans cancelled their African expedition and recalled the consular army from the 
south to the northern frontier, aiming to defend the Po valley, and hinder Hannibal’s 
advance into Italy. Such an approach is in line with the active defense military 
doctrine where the Romans preferred to employ an aggressive resistance and look 
for opportunities to counterattack and push Hannibal’s army out of the frontier 
(Havell, 1996). For that purpose the Romans merged their two consular armies and 
then chose to converge upon Hannibal who had less number of troops, and was 
weary after his journey through the Alps (Goldsworthy, 2000).  
 
In the year 217 BC, it is observable that the Romans still held fast to their 
active defense strategy to better protect Italy. This notion is evident in their troop 
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deployments in Sicily, Sardinia, and their coastal cities to prevent a possible 
Carthaginian naval operation (Lancel, 1998). In addition, the Romans deployed two 
consular armies in Arezzo and Rimini not only to bar the area to Hannibal, but also 
to converge upon him if he ever moves against one of the Roman armies stationed in 
central Italy (Lancel, 1998). Cary and Scullard (1976) focus upon the deployment of 
the new consular armies in central Italy, and argue that the Romans were still 
committed to their active defense doctrine and eager to defend the central Italian 
region. Scullard (1991), approaches from a wider perspective and argues that the 
Romans, abandoning the flatlands of the north and hoping to use the supplies of the 
south, planned to deploy themselves along the Apennines and in central Italy, 
thereby defending the area towards the center of the peninsula. He adds that the 
Romans, unsure where Hannibal would pass the mountains, deployed themselves 
accordingly, and so that with the natural boundaries at their flanks, they could 
squeeze Hannibal, who would eventually, pass between them (Scullard, 1991: 207). 
Robinson (1977) mentions the aggressiveness of the consul Flaminius, who 
followed Hannibal to the Lake Trasimene denying any more territory to the 
Carthaginian general. Goldsworthy (2000) states that in the middle months of 217 
BC, and after the ambush at Trasimene, even though representing a passive nature at 
first, the dictator Fabius did possess the will to implement an aggressive defense, 
however when taken into consideration his ill trained troops, it seemed wiser for him 
to adopt a more cautious course of action with slower maneuvers.  
 
Concerning the events in 216 BC, Lazenby (1973) argues that the Roman 
desire to end the Italian campaign with a decisive victory prompted the consuls to 
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concentrate their forces at the south of the peninsula; thereby barring Hannibal’s 
movements and denying any valuable territory to his foraging Carthaginian army. 
Mommsen (1996) states that the Romans after witnessing that Hannibal had 
captured a valuable logistical base and a fertile territory at the south east of the 
peninsula opted to put an end to the Carthaginian devastations. Polybius (1984) 
argues that the Roman Senate, believing that a more aggressive defensive policy was 
needed to protect the Italian peninsula before it would be wiped out by the 
Carthaginians, pressed for a pitched battle near Cannae so that the Italian front 
would eventually be closed. 
 
Regarding the Roman intention of wearing down the already thinned army of 
Hannibal, Mommsen (1996) states that at the Battle of Ticinus, Scipio, at the head of 
his cavalry and light troops dashed forward so that his forces would render 
reconnaissance movements for Hannibal to be impossible, and he would lack 
provisions without acquiring adequate knowledge of the area could be trapped. To 
add, Mommsen (1996) claims that since the Romans lost the Battle of Ticinus, to 
further prevent the movement of Hannibal, Scipio deliberately destroyed the bridges 
over Po, therefore making it more difficult for Hannibal to find a safe passage over 
the cold river with hostiles around him. Scullard (1991), argues that at the Battle of 
Ticinus, Scipio, who wanted to capitalize on the weary Carthaginian army after its 
descent from the Alps, attacked with his cavalry so that his Roman forces could 
push the Carthaginians further back, thereby presenting an active defense example. 
Zimmermann (2011) claims that Scipio, to prevent Hannibal’s joining with the 
Celts, and to hinder the Carthaginian advance, forced Hannibal’s vanguard to a 
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fight, but had to withdrew after heavy losses.  Grant (1978) touches upon the 
aggressiveness of the defensive operations of the Romans in the Battle of Trebia 
stating that the two consuls’ intention was to counter attack Hannibal before his 
army could reinforce itself among the Cisalpine Gauls. Scullard (1991), concerning 
the events of 217 BC, states that the maneuver movements of Fabius’ master of 
horse, Minucius, forced Hannibal to change his camp, denied him a safe bivouac, 
and chose to counter-attack the Carthaginian position.  Connolly (1998) argues that 
the Romans deliberately chose to employ a new kind of active defense under the 
dictator Fabius, so that harassing attacks of the Roman army would weaken the 
baseless Carthaginian Army, forcing it to tire itself out without acquiring provisions 
for their operations.  
 
Concerning the Roman ambition of capturing the initiative through an 
aggressive defense, Starr (1971), mentions the Roman army movements in northern 
Italy before the in the winter of 218 BC and argues that the eagerness of the two 
consuls to converge upon the Carthaginian army presents their keenness to close the 
northern campaign with a large decisive battle. About the Battle of Trebia, Myres 
(1950) mentions the cavalry raids of Hannibal and argues that the Romans fed up 
with Hannibal’s provocations and ravaging, aimed at crushing him in a large battle 
along the line of the Po, so that the Roman position at the North of Italy would be 
recuperated. Regarding the military decisions of the Roman Senate in the early 217 
BC, Mommsen (1996) mentions that the consuls, after stationing themselves along 
the Apennines, aimed to move north and join with the remnants of the previous 
Roman armies so that they could squeeze Hannibal as he descended south and 
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sought to soundly defeat him by concentrating their available legions. Livy (1972: 
97), about the Roman desire to acquire the initiative from Hannibal states that at the 
Battle of Trasimene in April 217 BC, the Roman consul Flaminius planned to 
launch a counterattack; however he fell into an ambush and was killed by the 
Carthaginians; while the other consul, Geminus sent his cavalry to join with the 
Flaminius’ forces aiming to converge upon the Carthaginians from the eastern side; 
but was also annihilated at another ambush in the vicinity of the battle area. Lancel 
(1998) cites the opportunistic move of Flaminius, arguing that the consul 
intentionally followed Hannibal aiming to find a favorable ground to corner him and 
put an end to his Italian campaign.  
 
In May 217 BC, the Romans appointed a dictator, Fabius Maximus, who is 
well known for his delaying tactics. However, even though it seems that the dictator 
Fabius abstained from getting into an open confrontation with Hannibal, or was too 
cautious, it is possible to find traces that actually he did not forego of the Roman 
active defense strategy and he did act to grasp the initiative from Hannibal.  For 
instance, at the clash near Pietravairano and in the Falernian Fields, Fabius 
deliberately planned to lay a trap for Hannibal so that the Carthaginian general could 
not escape without giving a fight and would be compelled to attack the better 
positioned Romans holding the higher ground and superior in terms of infantry 
(Connolly, 1998). In addition, at the clash near Geronium, the Roman forces still 
aimed to grasp the initiative from Hannibal, and even after numerous pitched battle 
defeats, they did not hesitate to force Hannibal into the defensive by threatening his 
rearguard and encampments. Lancel (1998) states the cunning side of Fabius, and 
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argues that the dictator carefully observed Hannibal’s movements in Italy and 
followed him closely so that his legions would capitulate on the Carthaginians when 
they were in a weak position.  
 
 On the events of 216 BC and the desire of the Romans to pursue a battle is 
scrutinized by Bradford (2000) who argues that it was the Roman will to grasp the 
initiative in war and avenge the previous defeats of Trebia and Trasimene by 
decisively defeating Hannibal in a huge battle. Havell (1996) points out the 
maneuvers of the consuls prior to the Battle of Cannae, and states that the Romans 
deliberately aimed to trap Hannibal between natural obstacles so that without an 
escape terrain, the Carthaginians would crumble under the counterattack of the 
numerically superior legions. Connolly (1998) also mentions the Roman intention of 
grasping the initiative from Hannibal, and argues that the Senate deliberately opted 
for a pitched battle so that the Carthaginians would be utterly defeated by the 
concentration of the Roman forces within a single area. 
 
Therefore, even if it is not explicitly mentioned in any historical or military 
text, it is worth arguable that the actual Roman military strategy in the first phase of 
the Second Punic War (218 – 216 BC) was to combine offense and defense, but 
giving more emphasis on the defense, in which they could merge their offensive and 
defensive doctrines, stop Hannibal’s invasion, grasp the initiative from him, and 
gain a foothold in Spain or North Africa. I argue that such an approach was in line 
with the modern military concept of active defense where the modern doctrine also 
combined offense and defense, allowing strong counter attacks, and looked for 
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opportunistic military measures that would strip the initiative from the enemy, wear 
it down, and employ an aggressive defense. 
 
2.9. Conclusion for Chapter II 
 
This chapter gave a descriptive, as well as an analytical history of Rome and 
Carthage, their early years, mutual relations, and the Punic Wars.  The chapter states 
that the Romans and the Carthaginians have been interacting since the 6th century 
BC, favoring cordial relations. However, as the years passed and the matters 
concerning their political, economic, and military interests changed, so did their 
mutual perceptions, thereby leading to the deterioration of the relatively peaceful 
interactions to a period of war and conflict. The chapter additionally states that 
Rome emerging victorious after the First Punic War disrupted the balance of power 
in the western Mediterranean, affecting Carthaginian desires for regaining its lost 
position in a future war; therefore the Second Punic War erupted in 218 BC. In this 
war, both Carthage and Rome devised certain grand and military strategies that were 
in line with their political, economic, and military ambitions and capabilities. The 
military strategy of the Carthaginians was of an offense towards Italy, striking the 
Roman center of gravity. To implement this military strategy the Carthaginians 
chose to execute a land operation across the Alps invading Italy. In the chapter it 
was revealed that naval complications, risk factors, and Hannibal’s capabilities had 
prompted the Carthaginians to neglect other possible actions such as naval attack or 
defense. As for the Roman military strategy the Senate had initially planned to 
invade the Carthaginian centers of gravity with an offensive campaign; however had 
to back down towards a more balanced and a defense oriented military strategy to 
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cope with the Hannibal’s land attack. The chapter states that the Roman military 
strategy and the military action employed to defeat Hannibal’s land attack was in 
line with the modern military concept of active defense where the defender would 
produce an aggressive area defense. The chapter argues that there were three main 
factors prompting Rome to pursue an aggressive defensive doctrine these were 
bound to their estimations to better protect Italy, to weaken or wear down Hannibal 
with numerical superiority, and to capture the initiative by crushing Hannibal’s army 
in Italy. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
 
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR MODEL 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction to Chapter III 
 
This Chapter examines the Second Punic War Model, its basis of 
development, construction, and formation. By giving pithy and informative 
information regarding the definition of game theory and extensive form games, this 
chapter describes why and how game theoretic method is chosen for analyzing the 
Second Punic War. In addition, it describes how the model that reflects the strategic 
interaction between Rome and Carthage is formed, how the players are selected, 
how the strategies or actions defined, and how the preferences of the players are 
assigned, the chapter describes the building blocks of the model and shows how an 
extensive model game that corresponds to the actual events of the Second Punic War 
can be formed and examined through the principles of game theory.  
 
 
3.2. Why Game Theoretic Methodology? 
 
Game Theory is a powerful tool and an innovative quantitative research 
method used in social and natural sciences to analyze situations of strategic 
interaction under mutual interdependence. Morrow (1994: 3) states that strategic 
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interactions are a part of social interactions, and game theory, which particularly 
focuses upon the interrelatedness of the individuals’ decisions and on the possible 
outcomes of those decisions, corresponds to the exact research technique that can 
analyze the interactions among interacting parties. Strategic interdependence 
constitutes the main building block and the primary assumption of game theory and 
it is described in the following sense:  “an outcome of an action implemented by a 
person depends not only on the action taken by that individual, but also on the 
actions taken by others” (Carmichael, 2005: 3). Therefore, under strategic 
interdependence, individuals, before making a decision, takes into consideration 
others’ actions and the possible outcomes that they might reach through the result of 
their interactions.  
 
In addition, according to Morrow (1994), the “structure” around the 
individuals have a profound affect on their decision making processes; such as, the 
strategic environment they are in, their knowledge regarding their peripheral setting, 
or the amount of individuals they are encountering before making a decision 
influences their predictions and strategic thinking.  Hence, Game Theory, by 
providing models to study the interactive decisions of the individuals and their 
relation with their environments (structure), creates an opportunity of formalization, 
discipline, and systemization so that it is possible to build an analytical framework 
and study these interactions in a scientific and accurate way. By constructing 
models, Game Theory not only aims to simplify the complex environment into an 
abstraction, but also by ruling out the complications within the real life events, it 
reflects and captures the essence of the situation and provides a scientific prediction 
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or a probable solution to that state of affairs (Osborne, 2009). However, Game 
Theoretic models have certain assumptions which are centered on the notion of 
rationality. Rationality in Game Theory can be described in the following sense: 
given a number of pre-determined preferences of a decision maker, the individual 
(decision maker) considers these preferences and then selects the best action among 
a set of available actions (Yılmaz, 2009: 2). This selection process with regard to the 
preferences is called rational action in Game Theory. In addition, Game Theory also 
assumes that rational players are aware of their alternative actions, have pre-fixed 
preferences over their actions or outcomes, and determine their actions through 
optimization (Yılmaz, 2009: 2). 
 
The Second Punic War was also a situation of strategic interaction. There 
were two main actors, the Roman and the Carthaginian Republics, and they were in 
a strategic puzzle, where one’s actions and information regarding the war, affected 
other’s actions, and eventually the outcome of the interaction. They had certain pre-
planned strategies of action and they had considered a ranking to pursue those 
actions, such as, choosing attack over defense. In addition, when deciding their 
military strategies, both states knew that they were mutually interdependent to the 
other’s responses towards their actions, for instance when responding to an attack 
strategy with a defensive strategy, or they considered and evaluated the type of their 
actions, such as an attack through land or by sea or staying purely on the defense or 
not. Hence, through Game Theory it is possible to formalize and construct the 
Roman and Carthaginian strategic interaction and present how they mutually 
responded each others’ actions in the war. 
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Furthermore, wars and military conflicts are complex matters and are 
difficult to be analyzed in coherence. They are not only comprised of military 
confrontations, but are also comprised of numerous factors that are affecting the 
course of the conflict;  politics, economy, society, and culture  are all affecting the 
initiation, progress, and the consequences of the war. Therefore it is intricate to 
include all these factors and analyze the strategies implemented in the conflict.  
However, the ability to make abstractions using Game Theory provides the 
opportunity to analyze complex events, formalize military conflicts and generate 
new explanations. The model presented below is also an abstraction of the war 
between Carthage and Rome. The Second Punic War was also a complex event 
where not only the two Republics fought with each other but also their allies, 
subjects, and supporting nations intervened into the conflict affecting a wide range 
of international and domestic dynamics. Game Theoretic modeling however, not 
only enables to coherently capture the essence of the conflict but also by defining 
the actors of war, their strategies and preferences in a disciplined, formal, and 
rigorous way, it provides the possibility to capture the essence of the conflict and 
comprehensibly analyze the conflict, enabling the provision of additional 
explanatory inferences.   
 
 
3.3. Why Model the Second Punic War? 
 
Modeling is technique used in Game Theory. Its aim is to reflect the 
complexities of the real world interactions through a cogent abstraction, in which the 
decision making processes between actors and major interdependent events are 
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clarified, analyzed, or solved in a concise manner (Osborne, 2009). According to 
Morrow (1994: 7), models, either formal or game theoretic, provides a valuable 
comprehension of the real world complexities; and through their precise structure, 
they can directly reflect the main argument of a theme that has multiple 
assumptions, through their clear and representative nature, they can indicate 
complex or intricate events by of simple matrices or game trees, through their 
accumulative configuration, they can merge smaller models with larger ones and 
thus explain larger phenomenon, through simplification, they can present the ability 
to capture the essence of a situation, and through abstraction, they provide the 
display of complex events by simple terms that omit trivial information.  
 
To be as clear as possible, the main reasons behind constructing this Second 
Punic War Game Model arose due to the two necessities observed in the literature of 
Game Theory and its relation to history. The first one is the ambition to make a 
contribution to the game theoretic literature and show the applicability of the game 
theoretic modeling techniques to the wars of antiquity, - which are generally 
neglected by game theorists who mostly prefer to apply this method to more recent 
wars, events, conflicts, or abstract war concepts - and thereby present that it is also 
worth examining the clashes of the antique ages.  The literature that includes war 
and game theory is huge (O’Neill, 1995; Özdamar, 2007). These models include 
analyses that concern with: international negotiations, where the parties seek 
solution for critical situations (Zagare, 1977; O’Neill, 1990; Downs & Rocke, 
1977); arms building or arms races, where the actors seek protection or dissuade the 
attacker (Schelling, 1976; Jervis, 1978; Powell, 1993); deterrence, in which the sides 
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aim to prevent the other taking aggressive action (Schelling, 1967; Powell, 1994; 
Kilgour and Zagare, 1993); outbreak of war, where the underlying reasons for wars 
are revealed (Fearon, 1995; Schelling, 1960; Nicholson, 1970); missile defense or 
for optimization of protective air defense measures (Kirby, 1988); nuclear war and 
its implications on defense and offense decisions of players (Kaplan, 1983; Grotte, 
1982); the Cuban Missile crisis (Wagner, 1989; Brams, 1985; Fraser & Hipel, 
1982); and analysis regarding military strategy or military doctrine (Dresher, 1968; 
O’Neill, 1993; Shubik, 1987).  
 
Among these models, there are game theoretic works that particularly 
analyze historical wars and conflicts, which I also aim to contribute. For instance, 
Isaacs (1999), through game theory and differential games, models the American 
Revolutionary War and particularly the Battle of Bunker Hill in which he elaborates 
on the maximum effectiveness of rifle firing towards an approaching enemy and its 
relation with the distance and timing of the fire. Mongin (2009), by predominantly 
considering Napoleon’s decision to divide his army after the Battle of Ligny; 
combines game theory with the War of the Seventh Coalition and Napoleon’s 
Hundred Days Campaign. Brams (2011), by applying game theory and the theory of 
moves, aims to explain the concept of magnanimity, and presents its affects on the 
decisions of the victorious and defeated actors through the analysis of cases ranging 
from the Franco-Prussian War, to the US Civil War.  Zagare (2011) looks at the 
initial years of the First World War and uses game theory and perfect deterrence 
theory to explain several important historical questions concerning the chain of 
events and interactions among Germany, Russia, Austria, France, Britain, and Serbia 
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leading to the eruption and the expansion of the war. Bennett and Dando (1979) 
models the French and German strategies of the Battle of France in 1940 and by 
giving examples from the successful predictions of the German staff, argues that the  
players do not always perceive the same game as their opponents. Haywood (1954) 
models two critical cases within the Second World War, the Rabaul-Lae Convoy 
Situation and the Avranches Gap Situation, arguing that the US military doctrine of 
decision employed and followed by the American generals in the war presented 
correlation and correspondence with the concepts of game theory, and that the US 
military doctrine might even be better comprehended or developed using the theory 
of games. Hipel, Wang, and Fraser (1988) concentrated upon the Falklands War, 
and argue on the implication of the concept of misperception on the sides which are 
entangled in an armed conflict. Zagare (1981), to explicate the concept of “non-
myopic equilibria”, looks upon the Six Day War of 1967 and builds a model that 
incorporates the strategies of United States, Soviet Union, and Israel. Said and 
Hartley (1982), through a hypergame approach, analyzes the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, and concludes that modeling conflicts using hypergames also vividly and 
coherently reflects decision making processes under crisis situations. Fraser, Hipel, 
Jaworsky, and Zuljan (1990), uses conflict analysis approach – a game theoretic 
solution technique- and aims to model the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to look for 
an equilibrium and resolution for the ongoing crisis situation. Güner (1998), through 
a game theoretic analysis, scrutinizes the low intensity conflict between Syria and 
Turkey in the early 1990s, and the repercussions of both states’ strategic interactions 
regarding issues of water and terrorism.  
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However, when compared to the studies concerning war, battles, or similar 
large scale arms conflict, game theoretic works and models which deal with the wars 
of antiquity are rare; hence this presents an opportunity for contribution. Among the 
constructed models, Tsebelis (1989), by giving examples from the Peloponnesian 
War, considers the importance of players’ preferences regarding their sequence of 
moves and the conditions which compel them to move first or second. Similarly, 
Heap and Varoufakis (1995) while examining evolutionary game theory, scrutinizes 
the Athenian – Melian Debate within the Peloponnesian War, and touches upon the 
relation between moral content and strategic decision making by stating that players’ 
decisions vary in accordance with their dominant or weak positions, and that 
sometimes players may disregard morality. Niou and Ordeshook (1994), analyze the 
writings of Sun Tzu, who was a Chinese military strategist living 2500 years ago, 
and evaluate the degree of compatibility and consistency of Sun Tzu’s writings with 
the Game Theoretic implications. Cotton and Liu (2012), game theoretically 
analyzes two cases, the Legend of Zhuge Liang (144 BC), and the empty fort 
strategy (224 AD) from ancient China, and touch upon the concept of deception and 
trickery employed in the battlefield. Steven Brams (1982) incorporates game theory 
with the Hebrew Bible and aims to explain non-cooperative behavior and the 
strategic choices, interactions or moves of several Biblical characters such as Adam 
and Eve, Israel (patriarch Jacob), or even God, and argues that given the preferences 
and information regarding a predefined environment they were in thorough history, 
the actions of such personalities can be interpreted or explained as being rational.   
Regarding diplomacy or the diplomatic aspect of the strategic interactions in the age 
of antiquity are thoroughly analyzed by Güner & Druckman (2000a and 2000b) and 
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Güner & Druckman (2003) who have looked at the complex ambassadorial 
exchanges called Amarna letters, and its political and social implications on the 
interacting Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations.  
 
The second reason that prompted me to approach the Second Punic War 
using game theoretic modeling methodology was to prove that game theory can 
bring a new perspective to the previous historical explanations of Carthage’s and 
Rome’s military decisions in the Second Punic War; and therefore, to contribute to 
the military historical literature which also looks at the reasons behind the 
Carthaginian and Roman strategies in the Second Punic War in a verbal way. 
Historians have predicted diverse views regarding Carthage’s and Rome’s strategy 
choices in the Second Punic War; however, Game Theory, by grasping the essence 
of the conflict, can provide additional premises for the already existing explanations 
regarding the Second Punic War. The model presented here combines the historical 
elucidations, and through molding it into an extensive form game, and when 
compared to a verbal presentation, it can show the sequence of moves, the actors, 
and their strategies in a more schematic, disciplined, coherent, and explanatory way. 
Hence, with the intention to build a game theoretic model is to capture the essence 
of the conflict, present it in a consistent way and look for additional premises it 
could bring, and contribute to the already existing historical explanations.  
 
 
3.4. Why Sequential Game Model in Extensive Form? 
 
Sequential Games are games where a sequence or an order of moves exists 
among players.  Unlike static games where players move at the same time and 
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without knowing what other players have chosen, sequential games represent 
interactive situations that show a sequence of moves between the players. These 
games not only allow players to move in turns, but also fully (sequential game of 
perfect information) or partially (sequential game of imperfect information) permits 
them to see what their opponents have selected in the previous turns, thus giving a 
more dynamic approach to the issue and reflect the interaction in a more realistic 
way.  Chess is an example for sequential games, where the white player starts the 
game by making a move, and black, after seeing the move of the white, responds, 
thus triggering a sequence of predictable moves.   
 
Sequential games are represented in extensive forms, or more commonly 
known as game trees where the game begins with an initiation point and extends 
downwards describing the chain of interaction between the players. This downward 
extension is made through branches that denote the actions of players. In extensive 
form games, players move in turns, and their turns are indicated by small points 
(nodes) that connect their actions. Through these nodes, the players know when they 
are going to play and when their opponent will play.  Games in extensive form are 
constructed through the designation of a set of assumptions that constitute the 
building blocks of the model. These are: the set of players, which describes the 
players in the game; the order of moves, which denotes the sequence of action and 
turns or movements of the players; payoffs, which are numbers or symbols that 
represent utility; preferences of the players, information, and actions available for 
the players. 
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The Second Punic War is constructed as a sequential game in extensive form 
with perfect information. Since the intention is to reflect the historical conflict as 
accurate as possible, and since Rome and Carthage responded each others’ moves as 
in a chess game, an extensive form game is chosen to reflect their strategic 
interaction. Since such a study is new in the literature, this simple model of perfect 
information is intended to provide a stable base for further research, expansion, 
incorporation, and development so that imperfect information, or a Bayesian game 
model could be built using its essence.   The model that mirrors the Second Punic 
War not only takes into consideration the players, Rome and Carthage, but also 
includes their strategies, preferences, payoffs, and outcomes, which are the basic 
building blocks of a model. Hence, through a game theoretic approach, and though a 
sequential game of perfect information in extensive form, it is intended to analyze 
the Second Punic War and present that game theory is applicable to ancient wars, 
and argue that such a rigorous method can provide additional statements towards 
their stagey choices and their war interaction. 
 
 
 
3.5. Building the Model 
 
 
3.5.1. The Set of Players 
  
When defining the set of players in this model, the unitary rational actor 
assumption is embraced. This assumption is linked with the Realist International 
Relations Theory which claims that states are not only the most important actors in 
international politics, but are also assumed to be rational, that is, given a pre-defined 
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set of preferences and available actions, the states assesses the alternatives and 
chooses the best course of action with regards to the outcome it provides. Under this 
Realist framework, the unitary rational actor assumption regards states as a single 
unit that reflects a general integrated notion of society, politics, and military forges 
as a single representative entity (Dunne and Schmidt, 2006). Hence, in line with the 
unitary rational actor assumption, the players defined for the model are simply the 
Carthaginian and Roman states, or in historic terms, the Republic of Carthage and 
the Republic of Rome.  
 
The reasons to adopt the unitary rational assumption are due to the following 
reasons: the city Senates and the governments of both Carthage and Rome decided a 
broad political, economic, and military strategy to be followed in the war (grand 
strategy); however, it was the commanders in chief that took the main role in the 
war and implemented war decisions, generated military plans, or employed a wide-
ranging military strategy in line with the political body. Therefore for the purpose of 
abolishing such confusion within decision making and decision taking mechanisms 
within the states, the unitary rational actor assumption is embraced so that the 
domestic dynamics or sub-players within states are integrated in to a single unit 
which easing its conjunction with the model. Secondly, due to the insufficiency of 
historical sources that considers the domestic politics of Carthage, it is difficult to 
determine the factions or the political parties that directly involved with the decision 
making process. Though it is known that the Barcid and the Hanno factions had a 
dominant affect on the decisions of the Carthaginian Senate, their speeches or direct 
actions were only stated by the Roman historian Livy (1972), which unfortunately 
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problematizes its verification and authenticity. Therefore since it was not cogent to 
assess both states’ governments as the main actors, but rather, states in general as 
players. 
   
The other main reason to adopt the unitary rational assumption is due to the 
problem of individual representation. In the war Hannibal conducted military affairs 
for the Carthaginians and he was the sole commander in chief from the beginning to 
the end of war. However, such an approach was not adopted by the Romans and the 
consuls, who also acted as the commanders in chief, were not only two in number, 
but also were only annually selected. Since the above-mentioned complication was 
expected to damage the overall essence of the model, historical personalities were 
not taken as players and together with the other nationalities such as the Spaniards, 
the Baleares, the Massiliotes, the Gauls, the Greeks, Africans, and Macedonians 
they are incorporated into the model as a single unit within the state in the model. 
Therefore, for coherence and consistency, the factions, individuals, consuls, royal 
families in power, or the governments in effect are not taken as distinct players, and 
for the sake of simplicity and clarity, the unitary rational actor assumption was 
embraced granting Carthage and Rome to be the sole players of the model.  
 
 
3.5.2. The Temporal Domain of the Model  
 
The model presented here deals with the strategic actions of Rome and 
Carthage between the summer of 218 BC and the summer of 216 BC that represents 
the first two years of the war. Since both Rome and Carthage did not employ a 
single coherent operational military strategy but different strategies during different 
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stages or phases of the war it is difficult to define exact strategies and actions for 
both of the states for the whole 17 year conflict (Jones, 1988). For instance in the 
first phase of the conflict we see Carthage pursing an offensive military strategy, but 
later on in the conflict, it is observable that the Romans have grasped the initiative 
and placed Carthage to the defensive.  Therefore, the model does not cover and 
represent the entire war; but rather, analyzes the Roman – Carthaginian strategic 
interactions in the first two years of the war, that is, when Carthage held the offense, 
and Rome stood on the defense.  
 
 
3.5.3. The Spatial Domain of the Model  
 
 The model analyzes the Carthaginian and Roman strategic interactions solely 
in Italy; it does not cover the strategies and actions taken by Carthage and Rome 
outside of the Italian campaign. Since the Second Punic War took place on six fronts 
covering Italy, Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, Illyria, and Africa; and witnessed varying 
Roman and Carthaginian operational military strategies on different regions, for the 
sake of simplicity and clarity, the model does not represent the Roman and 
Carthaginian interactions outside of the Italian peninsula. In addition, the military 
strategies of model covers the general approach adopted in the military arm of the 
Republics; hence it also covers the Roman and Carthaginian military actions 
employed in the naval arena around the Italian peninsula. Therefore, the 
representation of the operational military strategies covers only the Roman – 
Carthaginian confrontation in the Italian peninsula between the years 218 – 216 BC. 
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3.5.4. The Order of Moves 
 
 The model assumes Carthage as the player that moves first, and Rome the 
player that moves second. The model is intended to accurately reflect the war as 
much as possible; and regarding that it was Carthage who moved earlier to attack in 
the spring of 218 BC, Carthage is assumed to be the player that initially moves 
(Lancel, 1996). Rome, on the other hand, deployed its armies during the summer of 
218 BC thus leaving the initiative to the Carthaginians and compelling themselves to 
be the reacting player, or the player that moves second (Lancel, 1996).  Therefore, 
Carthage, as in the historic war, begins the game, and Rome by moving second, is 
assumed to react to the Carthaginian action.    
 
 
3.5.5. The Players’ Actions 
 
Actions of the players were defined according to the strategies they followed 
during the Second Punic War. With regards to the derivations from the historical 
analysis, it is assumed in the model that the Carthaginian strategy in the war was to 
challenge Rome’s military and political position in the Mediterranean region; and 
correspondingly, by pursuing an offensive approach, they sought to pursue an 
attacking strategy (Goldsworthy, 2000; Fronda, 2010; Lazenby, 1973). Therefore, in 
the model it is presumed that the main Carthaginian actions were to attack by land or 
to attack by sea, or in other words, Land Attack and Naval Attack. 
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The reason for selecting Land Attack as an action for Carthage was due to 
the observations made through history. It is known that Carthage, under the 
leadership of Hannibal, successfully crossed the Pyrenees and the Alps and 
possessed the capability to attack the Roman Republic via the land route spanning 
Spain, France and Italy. Therefore, by taking the historic action as a reference to the 
model, attacking through land was among the military actions available for Carthage 
during the Second Punic War.  Amongst the Land Attack option, the opportunity of 
conducting a Naval Attack was also installed into the model and was added to the 
set of Carthaginian actions. Such an action was installed due to the capability of 
Carthage which, by possessing a powerful navy also possessed the capacity to 
conduct a naval attack with all its maritime legacy and surprise the Roman Republic 
before they could muster their own naval force. Furthermore, Naval Attack is also 
an element of the offense-oriented military strategy, and since it presented an 
economic alternative to attacking by land, the naval attack action was selected to be 
the second constituent of Carthage’s attack strategy. 
 
The third action, No Attack, was also added to the model because there was 
also the probability that Hannibal or Carthage would not attack, or could opt for a 
defensive war where its initial offensive strategy would be neglected. It is known 
that Hannibal had deployed substantial forces in Spain and Africa, guarding those 
territories against a possible pre-emptive strike of the Romans at the beginning of 
the war. Furthermore, the model adds the No Attack action to Carthage so that 
normalization of the payoffs would be simplified and the process of the backwards 
induction solution technique –which is presented below- would be more clearly 
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observable. Therefore, in concluding terms, the actions available for Carthage are: 
Land Attack, Naval Attack, and No Attack. 
 
Since Rome is the second player to move, it is in a position that reacts 
against the Carthaginian attack strategy. The historical evidence presented in the 
previous chapter signifies that the Romans sought to prevent Carthage disrupt their 
Republic’s political position in the Mediterranean region and thus, sought to pursue 
a strategy that combined both offense and defense. Therefore, with regards to the 
Roman desire of preserving its own position within the Mediterranean, Active 
Defense and Passive Defense were assumed as Rome’s actions in the model. The 
reason, Active Defense was assumed as a Roman action was because it can be 
observed throughout 218 – 216 BC  that Rome not only aimed to defend its territory 
against the Carthaginians, but also sought to gain the initiative in the war through 
counter offensives aimed at disrupting Hannibal’s forces (Warry, 2006). Such an 
approach corresponds to the modern military term of active defense (Dictionary of 
Military Terms, 2001). Roman active defense was evident in the early land 
confrontations of the Second Punic War being employed by the Roman consuls in 
the battles of River Ticinus, River Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and at Cannae where the 
Roman armies sought aggressively to halt the advance of the Carthaginian army, 
deny them territory, and annihilate Hannibal’s troops by concentration of their own 
forces.   
 
In addition to Active Defense, the action of Passive Defense was also 
included in the model for Rome. As the contrast of the active defense, passive 
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defense is a modern military term that is attached to the actions of the defender who 
aims to stop the attacker’s impetus devoid of implementing a costly aggressive 
approach and without seeking to acquire the initiative (Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military Terms, 2001). Since, it was also probable that the Romans 
could concentrate purely on the defense of Italy, not risk their troops in open 
aggressive battles against the Carthaginians, neglect implementing counter-attacks 
and, lean towards a more passive action that solely depended on defending a portion 
of territory without seeking to gain the initiative. As a result there are in total of five 
actions available for the two players; three actions for Carthage (Land Attack, Naval 
Attack, and No Attack,) and two actions for Rome (Active Defense and Passive 
Defense).  
 
 
 
3.5.6. Outcomes 
 
Since the model represents a historical confrontation between Carthage and 
Rome and since that confrontation had escalated into an armed conflict witnessed in 
history, and since both Carthage and Rome had military definite strategies and 
conducted military operations, one of the outcomes in the model is evidently war. 
Given that Carthage is the first player to move and having two possible military 
actions, its selection of any one of them will compel Rome to reply using a counter 
military strategy, thereby automatically producing a war outcome. The other 
outcome assumed in the model is the Status Quo. Since it is assumed that Carthage 
also had a third No Attack option, it has the possibility of ending the conflict by not 
attacking Rome. Thus, by neglecting its offensive ambitions, Carthage by choosing 
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No Attack, can preserve the status quo and end the game without a war. Therefore 
there are two assumed outcomes: status quo and war. 
 
However, it is in our knowledge that in the reality if Carthage would not 
have attacked, then Rome would gain the initiative and conduct its own offensive 
operations towards the Carthaginian territories. This was evident in their war plans 
in which the Roman Senate commissioned one consul to take an army against 
Hannibal to Spain and one consul to make preparations to make an operation in 
North Africa (Connolly, 1998). However, since such a situation did not arise, and a 
Carthaginian attack by Hannibal did occur; the model did not continue the model 
that incorporated Rome’s possible counter attack actions or its other military 
operations. In addition, Rome’s counter-attack not only means the prolongation of 
the model but also compels us to add Carthaginian defense strategies which would 
alter the intended game, and in essence, not reflect the Second Punic War. 
 
 
3.5.7. Preferences of Players 
 
Game Theoretic models assume that players have preferences that affect 
decision choices. Those preferences could either be preferences over the outcomes 
or preferences over the actions. In this Second Punic War Game Model, it is 
assumed that players have preferences over actions so that the players choose their 
actions according to the action that brings a higher utility than the other.   This 
implies that, for instance, Carthage chooses Land Attack if the utility of attacking by 
land is higher than attacking by sea and indicates that the players are rational actors 
that choose the best course of action given their preferences.  
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3.5.8. Information 
 
Models constructed using the postulations and assumptions of Game Theory 
signifies that the players has to have information regarding their position in the 
game and of the available actions given to them at each position they arrive. Such an 
information status could either be perfect, where the players are not only fully aware 
of the game, but also know their actions, their positions, their opponent’s positions, 
their opponent’s actions, and the possible outcomes that they can reach. The model 
represented here is a perfect information game where the players are fully aware of 
all the abovementioned criteria. For instance Carthage knows it is the player that 
moves first, is going to start the game having three different courses of actions, and 
that Rome might reply them with two possible opposing actions that might lead to 
the outcome of war. On the opposite, Rome also knows that Carthage starts the 
game, it has three different actions, and that they themselves have to respond to the 
Carthaginian actions chosen in the game by two possible defense options. In 
addition in perfect information games, players know the outcomes, preferences, and 
the payoffs of the game thereby, having the ability to observe the game as a whole. 
The reason to construct this model through the perfect information assumption is 
bound to the reasons that we not only aim to reflect the Second Punic War as 
understandable as possible, but also aim to establish a foundation for further and 
additional research perspectives of the next stages of the Second Punic War that 
would make possible for alterations, supplementary assumptions of actions, players, 
or outcomes.  
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3.5.9. Payoffs 
 
Payoffs are numbers that are assigned to the utility values of an outcome; 
thus instead of rewriting every complex or long utility equations, the modeler, to 
have a more simple and clearer perspective of the utility values in the game, assigns 
payoffs. Payoffs could either be numerical values or be abstract symbols. The model 
presented here uses symbols as payoffs that represent the utility equation. Since 
utility is defined as the value that corresponds to gain subtracted by cost (gain – 
cost), it is assumed that players has to have gains through their actions. It is assumed 
that the gain for the players (Carthage and Rome) is territory (R). It is assumed that 
both Rome and Carthage gave a high value for holding territory to win the war, and 
therefore, to be in line with the historical evidences, the model incorporates territory 
as the main gain factor. Territory, for this model not only represents ground that is 
controlled, but also population and conventional resources that it bears. The loss of 
this territory nullifies gain hence it is defined as negative territory, or (–R). The cost 
on the other hand is defined by the symbol (c), and it represents all possible war 
costs of Rome or Carthage. It is also worth mentioning that in the model the values 
of c and R are positive real numbers. 
The gain and loss of territory depends on the probability of success of their actions. 
Carthage wins the war with probability of p or loses the war with probability – p 
(minus p), Rome on the other hand, wins the war with the probability of – p and 
loses the war with probability of p. These values are also positive real numbers; but 
since they represent probabilities, they are between 0 and 1. 
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3.6. The Game Tree Representation of the Second Punic War 
 
The game tree (Figure 1) presented below represents the constructed model 
of the Second Punic War Perfect Information Extensive Form Game. In the figure, 
Carthage starts the game in a position that it possesses the option of choosing 
between three actions. Two of them are offensive actions that fell under the category 
of Carthage’s offensive strategy (Land Attack – Naval Attack) and one of them is a 
non-offensive action (No Attack). If Carthage chooses this non-offensive strategy 
the game ends in the Status Quo point where it also eliminates the response of 
Rome. However, if Carthage chooses one of its offensive actions, the game reaches 
to the position where Rome has to reply to that Carthaginian action. As in the 
Second Punic War, Rome then has to choose between either an action that combines 
offense and defense (active defense) or an action which places Rome on a defensive 
posture with minimal offensive element (passive defense). In either case the players 
reach the war outcome and that is the Second Punic War.  
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Figure 1: Game Tree of the Second Punic War Game Model. The figure displays the actions, 
payoffs, and the outcomes of the Carthaginian – Roman strategic interaction. 
 
 
 
3.6.1. Notation for the Game Tree 
 
The below notation list describes the meaning of the symbols, abbreviations, 
or the payoffs used in the game tree model of the Second Punic War. There are in 
total 12 letteral icons that represent the concept that are incorporated into the model.  
 
LA : Land Attack 
 
NA :  Naval Attack 
 
A' : Do not Attack 
 
AD : Active Defense 
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PD : Passive Defense 
 
c (1, 2, 3, 4 ,5 ) : War costs of Carthage (c > 0)  
 
d (1,2,3,4,5 ) : War costs of Rome (d > 0) 
 
p (1,2,3,4,5) : Carthaginian likelihood of victory  (0 < p < 1) 
 
1p (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): Roman likelihood of victory (0 < 1 – p < 1) 
 
R: The value of holding Roman territories for both Players ( R  > 0) 
 
R : The value of losing Roman territories for both Players (R < 0) 
 
SQ : The status quo is the point where the payoffs are normalized to (0, 0) for both 
players. Such normalization is intended to simplify the comparison of payoffs from 
war. 
 
 
3.7. Action Profile of the Players 
 
Set of Carthaginian Actions:  As the player who moves first, there are three 
elements in the set of Carthaginian actions; these are:  Land Attack (LA), Naval 
Attack (NA), and No Attack (A'). 
 
Set of Roman Actions: Since Rome is the second player to move and the one that 
reacts to the Carthaginian actions, Rome possesses two distinct defensive actions 
which are: Active Defense (AD) and Passive Defense (PD). However, Rome has 
two sets of actions depending on the strategy choice of Carthage. In other words, if 
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Carthage chooses Land Attack then the Roman action set is :  Active Defense (AD) 
and Passive Defense (PD) , and if Carthage chooses Naval Attack then the Roman 
action set is again Active Defense (AD) and Passive Defense (PD). Thus, the 
combined set of actions for Rome is the combination of all four elements of the two 
action sets, that is : AD   AD, AD   PD, PD AD, PD PD. 
 
Combined Set of Actions for both Players: If all the elements inside the action 
sets of the players are combined 12 permutations are achieved. These can be 
denoted as [ LA; AD   AD,  LA; AD   PD,  LA; PD  AD, LA; PD  PD,  NA; 
AD AD, NA;ADPD, NA; PDAD, NA; PDPD, A`; ADAD, A’; AD  PD, 
A’; PDAD, A’; PDPD ]. 
 
 
3.8. The Equilibria Table 
 
Concerning the actions and strategies for Carthage and Rome, the elements 
within the sets of actions, and the constructed game tree, there are 12 possible 
equilibria that can be reached using the backwards induction solution method on the 
Second Punic War Game.  These equilibria are shown on the below table, which can 
be read using the following example: Carthage’s choice of land attack, and Rome’s 
response with an active defense leads to equilibria 1.   Since backwards induction 
initiates the solution of extensive games by analyzing the choices of the player that 
moves last, and moving upwards to other players action preference assuming what 
the previous player has chosen, it can be seen that Rome has chosen active defense 
on two occasions concerning the possible Carthaginian attack choices.  
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Table 1: Number of possible equilibria for the Second Punic War Game are shown on this table.  
The Equilibria Table  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the 12 equilibria, only the first one is historically observed, others 
are hypothetical equilibria with no or little evidence from exact history. In addition, 
since the Second Punic War lasted for 17 years and mirrored many different 
strategies in different stages of the war, the paper only focuses upon the first two 
years of the war that is, from 218 BC to 216 BC.  It is known from actual history 
that at the outset of the war, Carthaginians, under the leadership of Hannibal Barca, 
had attacked through land crossing the Alps, and it is evident that the Romans, at 
least what I argue, have employed a defensive strategy to counter the Carthaginians. 
The first four equilibria focus upon the Carthaginian land operation and Rome’s 
# Carthage Rome 
1 LA AD , AD 
2 LA AD , PD 
3 LA PD , AD 
4 LA PD , PD 
5 NA AD , AD 
6 NA AD , PD 
7 NA PD , AD 
8 NA PD , PD 
9 A' AD , AD 
10 A' AD , PD 
11 A' PD , AD 
12 A' PD , PD 
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response with active or passive defense. Equilibria from five to eight represent the 
Carthaginian – Roman interaction when Carthage naval attacks and Rome 
implements an active or passive defense on the sea. And the last four equilibria 
indicate the possible incurrence of war when even though Rome chooses active 
defense or passive defense Carthage chooses not to attack.  
 
 
3.9. Conclusion for Chapter III 
 
This chapter has given a methodological perspective to the thesis by showing 
how one would construct a game theoretic model that analyzes the Second Punic 
War and how to make interferences from it. Firstly, the chapter has presented why 
game theory was chosen as a suitable method to explain the actions and strategies of 
Rome and Carthage in the Second Punic War and argues that that there was an 
opportunity for novel contributions to be made to the game theoretic and ancient 
history literature that would enable the addition of new explanations to the wars of 
antiquity. The chapter revealed that the game theoretic modeling literature has 
mainly neglected to analyze antique conflicts therefore revealing an available area of 
study within the game theoretic studies. Secondly, it is stated in the chapter that the 
constructed model for Second Punic War is a two person perfect information game 
in extensive form where there are two players Rome and Carthage, there are three 
actions for Carthage and two actions for Rome, and their militaristic actions lead to 
the outcome of war. In addition it is stated that the constructed model covers the 
strategic interaction of Rome and Carthage only in Italy and its surrounding waters, 
neglecting not in other fronts and covering the time frame between 218 BC and 216 
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BC where Carthage held the initiative and Rome stood on the defensive. The chapter 
concludes by giving a table of possible equilibria which would be thoroughly 
analyzed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
 
THE SOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND 
PUNIC WAR EXTENSIVE FORM GAME 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction to Chapter IV 
 
This chapter elaborates on the solution and the interpretation of the Second 
Punic War Extensive Form Game and aims to combine game theoretic findings with 
historical information obtained and used from Chapter II. This section additionally 
describes that the model is analyzed using the backward induction solution 
technique, which is an inference method that is used to solve extensive form games 
with perfect information. Through the solution of the model, the intention is to find 
connections from the game theoretic findings with examples from historical 
literature that complements the mathematical findings and not only to reveal obscure 
arguments that were failed to be observed by historians but also insert an additional 
argumentation to the available literary evidence; therefore making a contribution to 
the vague strategic parts of the Second Punic War. From the game model, it is found 
out that both players select their actions with respect to the relations between the 
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likelihoods of victory and the costs obtained from war.  At last the section of the 
chapter a conclusion is presented that wraps up the solution and the interpretation as 
a whole and reveals under what circumstances Carthage and Rome select particular 
military actions.  
 
 
4.2. Solution of the Second Punic War Model 
 
Solution of the Second Punic War Model is done through a method called 
backward induction, which is an iteration technique that helps analyze sequential 
games in extensive form. Backwards induction begins by determining the optimal 
action of the player that moves last and then by moving upwards towards earlier 
nodes assuming that the previous players would choose the action that will 
maximize their utility, revealing a path that designates the possible Nash equilibria.   
If the optimal actions of the players constitute Nash equilibria in every subgame, 
then the subgame perfect Nash equilibria is obtained. Therefore, to begin solving the 
game using backward induction, it is necessary to examine starting from the 
terminal node and since the war outcome is at the last phase of the game tree, firstly 
it is needed to calculate the expected utilities from war. This calculation stage is 
shown below. 
 
 
4.3. The Calculation of Expected Utilities from War 
 
 The Carthaginian utility from war if Carthage chooses land attack and if 
Rome responds with active defense:   1 1 1 1p (R c ) + (1 p )( c )  = 1 1p R c . 
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 The Carthaginian utility from war if Carthage chooses land attack and if 
Rome responds with passive defense:  2 2 2 2p (R c )  +  (1 p )(c )  = 2 2p R c . 
 
 The Carthaginian utility from war if Carthage chooses naval attack and if 
Rome responds with active defense:  3 3 3 3p (R c )  +  (1 p )(c )  = 3 3p R c . 
 
 The Carthaginian utility from war if Carthage chooses naval attack and if 
Rome responds with passive defense:  4 4 4 4p (R c )  +  (1 p )(c )= 4 4p R c . 
 
 The Roman utility from war if Carthage chooses land attack and if Rome 
responds with active defense:    1 1 1 1p ( R d )  +  (1 p )( d )  =  1 1p R d . 
 
 The Roman utility from war if Carthage chooses land attack and Rome if 
responds with passive defense:    2 2 2 2p ( R d )  +  (1 p )( d )  =  2 2p R d . 
 
  The Roman utility from war if Carthage chooses naval attack and Rome 
responds with active defense:    3 3 3 3p ( R d )  +  (1 p )( d )  =  3 3p R d . 
 
 The Roman utility from war if Carthage chooses naval attack and Rome 
counters with passive defense:    4 4 4 4p ( R d )  +  (1 p )( d )  =  4 4p R d . 
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4.4. The SPW Game in its Extensive Form with Calculated Expected Utilities 
 
After the calculation of both players’ expected utilities from war, the Second 
Punic War in Extensive Form Game transforms into the following game tree. It can 
be observed that the game tree is trimmed from below and the utilities for the 
Roman and Carthaginian actions are attached at the terminal sections of the 
branches. In the previous chapter a table covering the possible equilibria within the 
model was presented. With regards to that table and the actual interaction observed 
from the history of the Second Punic War, only Equilibrium 1 is calculated here. 
Since this equilibrium is the only one that could be observed from written history, it 
was decided that analyzing the Carthaginian land attack Roman active defense 
interaction would produce the best results that can be more easily analyzed and 
observed from diverse disciplines in social sciences.  
 
Figure 2: The Second Punic War extensive form game when expected utilities from war for both 
players are calculated. 
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4.5. General Remarks Regarding the SPW Game Model Analysis 
 
 According to the constructed model which represents the initial phase of the 
Second Punic War, that is the situation in which there exists a Roman – 
Carthaginian military interaction of offense and defense; due to the fact that 
Carthage possesses two offensive [Land Attack (LA) and Naval Attack (NA)], and 
one non – offensive [not attack (A’)]; and as a consequence of Rome having two 
defensive [Active Defense (AD) and Passive Defense (PD)] actions, it is revealed 
that there are in total 12 possible Nash Equilibria situations. These are: [ LA; AD   
AD,  LA; AD   PD,  LA; PD  AD, LA; PD  PD,  NA; AD AD, NA;ADPD, 
NA; PDAD, NA; PDPD, A`; ADAD, A’; AD  PD, A’; PDAD, A’; 
PDPD ]. 
 
 Among these Nash Equilibria conditions, it is observed that eight of them 
result in the war outcome, that is, the condition when Carthage’s preference of either 
land attack or naval attack is responded with Rome’s active defense or passive 
defense. These interactions and the possible war outcome is observed to take place 
when the following eight combinations occur: [LA; AD   AD,  LA; AD   PD,  
LA; PD  AD, LA; PD  PD,  NA; AD AD, NA;ADPD, NA; PDAD, NA; 
PDPD]. The other four equilibria, that is the instance when war does not occur and 
both player’s reach the Status Quo point and receive the same utilities, is reached 
when Carthage refuses to attack while Rome chooses one of its military actions [ A`; 
ADAD, A’; AD  PD, A’; PDAD, A’; PDPD ].  
 
 100 
 The decision calculus of the game is based on the assumption that the players 
choose a particular action among its available actions when the utility of one action 
is higher than the other or others; that is, if the situation in which the multiplication 
of the success probability value with the difference between the gain and cost values 
exceeds the rate of the other action or actions. When comparing the utilities to 
determine the conditions for a player to choose that particular action over the other, 
a threshold, or in other words, an inequality is achieved that describes the situation 
of when that player can and would choose that action. In the Second Punic War 
game model, this assumption is applied to the interaction and responses of Carthage 
and Rome towards each other and exemplified when analyzing the procedure of 
them making choices over their actions. 
  
 In addition to finding the condition or inequality that defines under what 
circumstances the players would choose a particular action, the relation between 
probability (p), gain (R), and cost (c ) values which affect satisfaction of the validity 
of the inequality, are also taken into consideration. It is found out that with regards 
to the inequality that satisfy the condition for an action to be chosen, only the 
existence of several cases provide the condition to mathematically hold; and with 
reference to this, the relation between p , R , and c are elaborated when analyzing 
the choice conditions of Carthage and Rome.   
  
 Among the 12 Nash Equilibria situations, it is observable that only the first 
equilibrium (EQ 1) is historically accurate and can be corresponded with the 
historical literary evidence, while others (EQ 2 – 12), which the model presents, are 
hypothetical or alternative interaction scenarios that could also take place in the 
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Second Punic War. This first equilibrium, which denotes the situation of Carthage 
attacking by land and Rome responding by choosing active defense, is the reflection 
of the events that occurred in the early phases of the war where Carthage in 218 BC 
attacked Rome via crossing the Alps with a large land army and Rome responded to 
the Carthaginians with an active defense by incorporating an aggressive area 
resistance with a counter attack doctrine and deployment large field armies on the 
ground at all times. Through the solution of the model, it is revealed that both 
Carthage and Rome had chosen the abovementioned actions only if the existence of 
certain conditions and cases regarding the values of success probability, gaining or 
losing Roman territory, and the degree of war costs provide the satisfactory 
circumstances for the players to prefer to attack by land over by sea, and to defend 
actively rather than passively.  
 
 
4.6. Findings from the Equilibrium Analysis  
 
 
4.6.1. Equilibrium 1  
 
 Equilibrium 1, which corresponds to the situation where Rome chooses active 
defense against a Carthaginian land attack, active defense against a Carthaginian 
naval attack, and where Carthage chooses land attack over its other alternative 
actions. This sequence of action in Equilibrium 1 represents the historically 
observed scenario in the SPW. Concerning the aforementioned decision calculus 
assumption that is incorporated into the model, it is observed that Rome and 
Carthage decides those particular actions when the utility of choosing them is higher 
than that of choosing their other actions. In this situation, it is evident that Rome 
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chooses active defense over passive defense, and Carthage chooses land attack over 
naval attack and no attack when the utility of choosing them is higher than that of 
choosing the latter actions.  
 
 
4.6.1.1. Rome’s Active Defense choice against Carthaginian Land Attack 
 
 With the application of the backward induction solution technique on the 
model, it is observed that Rome would choose active defense against a Carthaginian 
land attack when the following condition is satisfied; which is: if the difference 
between the Roman likelihood of victory from implementing active defense against 
a Carthaginian land attack and Roman likelihood of victory from implementing 
passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack, is smaller than that of the 
difference between the Roman passive defense war costs and active defense war 
costs divided by the value of holding the Roman territories. However it is also found 
out that this circumstance that denotes the Roman condition for choosing active 
defense over passive defense depended on the existence of several cases.   
 
With regards to the case analysis, it was firstly found out that the condition 
that denotes the Roman choice of active defense over passive defense against a 
Carthaginian land attack can hold when the Roman likelihood of victory from active 
defense was higher than that of passive defense and when the war costs of passive 
defense was higher than that of active defense. A historical example for this remark 
could be given from the historical analyses of both Dodge (1994; 77) and Lazenby 
(1973; 89) who argue that Rome, at the early phases of the war, chose to actively 
defend after foreseeing that it had a higher chance of victory from employing a more 
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“aggressive” defense over implementing other kinds of  defense, and would sustain 
a lesser amount of losses if they pursued an insistent defense policy by concentrating 
their legions into a single area around Hannibal, putting a huge army on the field 
that would diminish the damage done to economic production capacity of the 
country by Numidian cavalry, and would provide a greater chance to grasp the 
complete initiative from the Carthaginians who had little chance to receive 
reinforcements. 
 
 Secondly it was observed that the Roman condition of choosing active 
defense over passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack can hold when the 
Roman likelihoods of victory from active defense and passive defense was equal, 
and when the war costs of active defense was smaller than the war costs of passive 
defense. Such a remark is also parallel with the historical literary evidence which 
was described in Connolly (1998) who explains why the Romans chose to actively 
defend when their chance of winning the war through passive defense was 
approximately equal to active defense and the costs of employing active defense was 
smaller than passively defending by stating that the Romans, especially the consul 
Scipio, chose to counterattack and set up an aggressive defense in the north of Po 
valley after Hannibal’s descent from the Alps because even though knowing that the 
Roman fortified cities (Placentia and Cremona) and his static defensive position 
along the river Po could halt Hannibal’s advance, Hannibal had the capacity to 
bypass the Roman positions, as in the River Rhone, and could invade the Italian 
peninsula unopposed thereby making it more costly for the Romans in the northern 
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frontier. Hence, the consul attacked with his mobile forces to stop Hannibal’s 
possible maneuvers towards the south.    
 
Thirdly it is found out that the Roman condition of choosing active defense 
over passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack can hold when the Roman 
likelihood of victory from passive defense was higher than that of active defense and 
when the war costs of passive defense was higher than that of active defense. A 
historical example for this case was given by Dodge (1994) who argues that in the 
Battle of Trasimene, the Romans, even though had set up themselves in a static 
position at Arezzo and Rimini by thinking that they had more likelihood in defeating 
Hannibal who would be intercepted in these two roads heading to Rome, chose to 
employ an active defense by counterattacking Hannibal’s position around the Lake 
Trasimene fearing that Hannibal might threaten the city of Rome by bypassing the 
two consular armies’ positions in central Italy and thereby greatly jeopardizing the 
Roman military status. Therefore, Rome, fearing that passively defending would 
bring greater war costs for the city of Rome, chose to defend in an actively manner 
and chose to counterattack Hannibal’s advance towards Assisi.  
 
Fourthly, it was observed that the Roman condition of choosing active 
defense over passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack can hold when the 
Roman likelihood of victory from passive defense was higher than that of active 
defense and when the war costs of passive defense was equal to that of active 
defense. A historical example for this case would be the Roman maneuvers at the 
Battle of Geronium in 217 BC. As Connolly (1998) points out, the co-dictator 
Minucius, realizing that even though the Romans had a higher likelihood of victory 
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from employing a passive defense over active defense, chose to implement an 
aggressive stance towards Hannibal’s position near Geronium so to push the 
Carthaginians back. According to Connolly (1998) Minucius, witnessing that 
employing passive defense would enable Hannibal to freely ravage the Roman 
territories and bring more costs to the Republic, chose to move forward by risking 
his army to prevent Hannibal’s forages. The other dictator Fabius, after seeing his 
colleague’s gambling maneuver also joined the fight and deployed his army in battle 
order threatening the flanks of Hannibal and were successful in thwarting the 
Carthaginians back, therefore validating the above-mentioned  case to be fulfilled 
when Rome chose active defense even though they had less likelihood of victory.  
 
Lastly, it was found out that the Roman condition of choosing active defense 
over passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack can hold when Roman 
likelihood of victory from passive defense was higher than that of active defense, 
and when the war costs of passive defense was smaller than that of active defense, 
and when the difference between Roman war costs of passive defense and active 
defense is smaller than the value of holding Roman territories. Unfortunately there 
are no historical evidences to prove that this case can hold under the above-
mentioned conditions; therefore the revelation of this case through the model 
provides a novel argument for the history literature by stating that it is 
mathematically plausible to choose active defense over passive defense when such a 
circumstance occurs.  However, from historical or realistic lenses it seems to be 
difficult for Rome to asses. Choosing active defense even though  its likelihood of 
bringing victory is lesser than passive defense and the war costs of employing active 
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defense is higher than that of passive defense would surely seem difficult for Rome 
to foresaw and deciding the situation as suitable for preferring active defense. 
 
In addition, the model also generates the cases that nullifies the Roman 
condition of choosing active defense over passive defense against a Carthaginian 
land attack, and it is revealed that Rome would not choose active defense when even 
though having a high likelihood of victory, if the war costs of implementing active 
defense is higher or equal to that of passive defense; or if Rome is in a situation 
where the Roman likelihood of victory from active defense is equal to that of 
passive defense but the war costs from employing active defense is higher or equal 
to that of passive defense. It is evident that not only the likelihoods of victory that 
affects the Roman decision to implement an action, but also the degree of war costs 
determine the condition for active defense to hold. If the war cost of implementing 
active defense is higher or equal to that of passive defense the Roman active defense 
condition becomes void. This remark can be stated as significant because the game 
theoretic analysis have presented the circumstances in which the condition that 
enables Rome to choose active defense over passive defense against a Carthaginian 
land attack might become nullified and invalidated . Such an argumentation is not 
present in the historical literature and there were no evidence that describe the 
circumstances where Rome would not employ such an active defensive action. 
Thereby the game theoretic analysis has revealed openness in the history literature 
and presents a novel statement that describes when Rome would not choose active 
defense.  
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4.6.1.2. Rome’s Active Defense choice against Carthaginian Naval Attack 
 
 In the first phase of the Second Punic War, there were no major naval 
offensive by the Carthaginians that directly targeted the Roman heartland but only 
existed minor operations that aimed to disrupt Roman naval networks or attempts to 
send reinforcements to Hannibal. In the history chapter it was revealed that due to 
various reasons, Carthage, neglecting a direct naval operation, had preferred to 
implement a land offensive over Alps targeting Italy; thereby nullifying the 
formation of a historical analysis concerning the conditions or repercussions of a 
Carthaginian naval attack and the possible response of the Romans. However, the 
game theoretic model enables the explanation of an alternative history and provides 
the conditions and circumstances to show under how Rome would reply with an 
active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack. With the solution of the game 
model using backwards induction, it is revealed that Rome’s conditions and cases to 
choose active defense over passive defense against a Carthaginian land attack was 
similar with the Roman active defense response against Carthaginian naval attack. 
 
 It is observed that Rome would choose active defense against a Carthaginian 
naval attack if the utility of choosing active defense is higher than that of passive 
defense. This leads to the condition or inequality that if the difference between the 
Roman likelihood of victory from implementing active defense against a 
Carthaginian naval attack and Roman likelihood of victory from implementing 
passive defense against a Carthaginian naval attack, is smaller than that of the 
difference between the Roman passive defense war costs and active defense war 
costs divided by the value of holding the Roman territories. With regards to this 
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Roman active defense condition there are several cases which satisfy the Roman 
choice to be valid.  
 
Firstly it is observed that Rome’s condition that enables Rome to choose 
active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack holds when implementing active 
defense has higher likelihood of victory than that of passive defense and when 
employing active defense has lower war costs than that of passive defense. A 
historical circumstance that exemplifies this case was the naval encounter off the 
coast of Pisa, when the Roman fleet under Servilius, fearing that its passive stance 
would enable the approaching Carthaginian fleet which might easily reinforce 
Hannibal’s land army in northern Italy and jeopardize the Roman military position 
in the Italian campaign, presented an aggressive defense operation by sailing 
towards the Carthaginians fleet aiming to intercept it before its embarkment. 
According to Morrison and Coates (1996) the Romans believing that they had a 
stronger fleet and a higher chance of victory at sea by counterattacking the 
Carthaginians, quickly sailed towards Pisa where the Punic navy’s aim was to 
reinforce Hannibal and embark additional troops to greatly damage the uneasy 
Roman position at the Po valley.  
 
Secondly, it is revealed that Rome’s condition that enables Rome to choose 
active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack holds only if the Roman 
likelihood of victory from active defense is equal to that of passive defense and if 
the war costs of implementing active defense is lesser than that of passive defense. 
As an example for this case was the Roman naval operation around the Vulcan 
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islands; where, according to Casson (1991) the Romans even though expected no 
imminent threat from the Carthaginian fleet in the near time or could easily thwart a 
Carthaginian naval attack by simply guarding the sea routes or the coasts, dispatched 
a large navy to secure the Vulcan Islands, Pantelleria, and Malta therefore diverting 
a direct Carthaginian expedition to Italy, and discarding a surprise Carthaginian 
naval attack at a least guarded coastal settlement or port in the western Italian 
peninsula.  
 
Thirdly it is observed that the condition that enables Rome to choose active 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack holds when the Roman likelihood of 
victory from active defense is lower than that of passive defense, and when the war 
costs of active defense are also lower than that of passive defense. A historical event 
that exemplifies this case was the naval battle at Lilybaeum where, according to 
Steinby (2004), the Romans fearing that without an intervention the Carthaginians 
could take the strategic settlement of Lilybaeum in Sicily and endanger the military 
position of Rome in central Mediterranean by establishing a permanent base there, 
chose to intercept the Carthaginian fleet off the coast of western Sicily and displayed 
an active defense example by taking a large risk at the open seas and set sail to 
aggressively defend the strategic town of Lilybaeum estimating that whose loss 
would deliver a large blow to the Roman military presence in Sicily. 
 
 Fourthly, it is founded that the condition that enables Rome to choose active 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack holds when the Roman likelihood of 
victory from active defense is lower than that of passive defense, and when the 
Roman war costs of implementing active defense is equal to that of passive defense. 
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A historical example for this case was the Roman naval maneuvers off the coast of 
Sardinia in 217 BC. According to Casson (1991) the Romans, fearing that the 
Carthaginians with their more mobile fleets could embark on the island of Sardinia 
and prompt the local population to revolt and press forward to gain the initiative 
against the Roman bases in the island and later on in the central Mediterranean 
region, dispatched a large naval squadron to completely patrol around the waters of 
Sardinia and with an aggressive stance, deter the Carthaginian fleet which was 
planning to implement a minor amphibious operation. 
 
Lastly, it is observed that the condition that enables Rome to choose active 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack holds when the Roman likelihood of 
victory from active defense is lower than that of passive defense, and when the 
Roman war costs of implementing active defense is lower than that of passive 
defense, and when the difference between the Roman war cost of passive defense 
and active defense is smaller than the value of holding the Roman territories. 
Exemplification of this from the historical literature would be the Roman naval raid 
on Carthaginian North Africa coast in 217 BC, where the Romans took a great risk 
in implementing a large maneuver to divert the Carthaginian fleet away from Roman 
territories. According to Steinby (2004), the Romans even though knowing that they 
were operating away from their base or from any allied territory and were open to an 
attack from the Carthaginians in the risky unknown waters, conducted a limited 
counterattack towards the Carthaginian coastline so that the Carthaginian navy 
would be withdrawn from the Italian territorial waters and would be compelled to 
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aid the Carthaginian North African fleet thereby thwarting a possible naval 
operation.  
 
 As remarks for the Roman active defense choice over passive defense and 
against the Carthaginian naval attack, it is found out that Rome would decide to 
implement active defense when the utility of actively defending is higher than 
passively defending and when the difference between the Roman likelihood of 
victory from implementing active defense against a naval attack and Roman 
likelihood of victory from implementing passive defense against a naval attack, is 
smaller than that of the difference between the Roman passive defense war costs and 
active defense war costs divided by the value of holding Roman territories. However 
after the case analysis it is also observed that Rome chooses active defense against a 
Carthaginian naval attack depending on the circumstances. If Rome is in a position 
where it has high or equal amount of likelihood of victory from implementing active 
defense, it chooses active defense only if the war costs of active defense is lower 
than that of passive defense. Additionally, it is also observed that if Rome is in a 
position where it possesses low likelihood of victory from implementing active 
defense Rome would choose active defense only if the war costs of implementation 
of active defense is either lower than or equal to that of passive defense. And lastly 
if Rome is in a position where it possesses a lower likelihood of victory than that of 
passive defense it chooses active defense only if the war cost of actively defending 
is higher than that of passive defense with the addition of a stipulation that the 
difference of the war costs would be smaller than the value of holding Roman 
territories.  
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 The model also displays the circumstances in which the Roman condition 
that enables it to choose active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack can not 
hold. It is found out that Rome, when even though has a high likelihood of victory 
from implementing active defense does not decide to do so if the war costs of 
employing active defense is equal or lower to that of passive defense. In addition, 
the Roman condition of active defense also becomes nullified when the Roman 
likelihood of victory from active defense is equal to that of passive defense and 
when the Roman war costs of implementing active defense is equal or lower to that 
of passive defense. Such a deduction enables game theory to reveal under what 
cases Rome, even though having a higher utility of choosing active defense, would 
not satisfy the condition to take place. Such an argumentation is not evident in the 
historical literature and thus a new claim is revealed using the interactive decision 
theoretic assumptions and methodology.   
 
 
4.6.1.3. Carthage’s Choice of Land Attack 
 
 We know from history that Hannibal attacked the Romans by crossing the 
Alps and descending down to the Po Valley in 218 BC. However, if Hannibal would 
know that Rome would employ an active defense would he still attack the Romans 
by land?  The constructed game model provides the conditions and circumstances in 
which the Carthaginians would decide to launch a land attack over naval attack or 
not attacking. With regards to the backward induction technique and by assuming 
that Rome would choose active defense against a Carthaginian land attack and 
against a Carthaginian naval attack, it is possible to compare the utilities of the 
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Carthaginian actions and figure out under what conditions Carthage would choose 
land attack and compare them with the historical argumentations.  
 
 There are various reasons within the historical literature for the Carthaginian 
land attack decision; however, the game model presented here provides a new 
argumentation and claims that Carthage would choose to attack by land when the 
utility of land attacking is greater than that of naval attacking and that of no 
attacking. This leads to the condition that if the difference between the Carthaginian 
likelihood of victory from attacking by land and the Carthaginian likelihood of 
victory from attacking by sea is greater than the difference between the Carthaginian 
war costs from land attack and that from naval attack is divided by the value of 
holding Roman territories, and if the Carthaginian likelihood of victory is greater 
than the ratio of the Carthaginian war costs from land attack and the value of 
holding Roman territories, then Carthage chooses land attack. However, it is 
observed that for the Carthaginian condition to be satisfied there exists several cases 
to provide the Carthaginian land attack inequality to hold. These are examined 
below.  
 
With regards to the Carthaginian land attack condition that enables Carthage 
to choose land attack over naval attack, primarily it is found out that when the 
Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is greater than that of naval 
attack and when the war cost of implementing land attack is larger than that of naval 
attack and when the difference between the Carthaginian war costs from these 
attacks are smaller than the value of holding Roman territories, then Carthage would 
choose land attack.  Fields (2010) provides the historical correspondent to the 
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abovementioned condition for the Carthaginian choice of land attack and claims that 
even though Carthage would have estimated that it might suffer higher war costs 
from a land attack than that of a successful naval attack by attempting to cross 
Europe’s two highest mountain ranges in autumn and winter seasons, taking into 
consideration the higher likelihood of victory of land attack when compared to naval 
attack where the fleet had the possibility of being destroyed by storms, lack of 
provisions, or interception of a Roman fleet, they chose to implement an attack 
through land where they could hold the army in a much more compact and unified 
status than at that of the  sea and might success fully capture more territory.  
 
Secondly, it is observed that the Carthaginian land attack condition can hold 
when the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from attacking by land is greater than 
that of attacking by sea, and when the Carthaginian war costs from land attack is 
equal to that of naval attack. Concerning this circumstance, Liddell Hart (2002) 
argues that Carthage chose to attack by land because it had estimated that it would 
have a higher chance of victory over the Romans by linking up with the Celts of the 
Po Valley and swelling their lost ranks with Celtic warriors. However Hart (2002) 
also adds that Carthage’s war costs if it ever attempted a naval attack was also 
approximately similar to that of land attack; since Rome did not possess the capacity 
to fully control the Mediterranean Sea and it did not concentrate its fleet at a single 
front but rather had a dispersed fleet that had different objectives (Hart, 2002: 42). 
 
 Thirdly, it is revealed that the Carthaginian condition of land attack can hold 
when the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from attacking by land is greater than 
that of naval attacking and when the war costs of land attacking is smaller than that 
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of naval attacking. The most widely claimed argument among historians about the 
reason for Hannibal or Carthage in choosing land attack over naval attack in its war 
with the Romans was about the Carthaginian estimation of having more success in 
attacking by land and their fear of war costs when they would embark on an 
amphibious operation towards the Italian peninsula.  On this argument Miles (2010), 
Hoyos (2003), and Connolly (1998) argue that the Carthaginians preferred to launch 
a land invasion because they must have observed that it would be less riskier and 
less costly than that of naval attack, they could avoid interceptions by the Roman 
armed forces, and their commander n chief Hannibal had a larger cavalry force that 
enabled the execution of maneuver warfare; whereas if they attempt a naval attack, 
they would have to deal with a superior Roman navy which would not only sink the 
war vessels of the Carthaginians but also the transport ships which would 
completely endanger the whole operation.  
 
 Fourthly, it is found out that the Carthaginian land attack condition can hold  
when the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is equal to that of naval 
attack and when the war costs of land attack is smaller than that of naval attack.  
Concerning this case Connolly (1998) argue that Carthage did actually possess a 
formidable fleet at the disposal of Hannibal who would have thought he did have an 
opportunity of successfully transporting his army directly to Italy and thereby 
winning valuable time before the Romans responded. However, Connolly (1998) 
also adds that a single disaster at sea would ruin the operation and would put 
immense amount of costs to the fighting power of the Carthaginians; hence 
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Hannibal chose the other option of crossing the Alps and circumventing the dangers, 
risks and high costs of the sea.  
Additionally, it is observed that the Carthaginian land attack condition can 
hold when the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is smaller than 
that of naval attack, and when the Carthaginian war costs from land attack is greater 
than that of naval attack, and when the difference of the two Carthaginian war costs 
is greater than the value of holding the Roman territories. There is no historical 
evidence or any literary argument to complement the validity of this circumstance; 
hence its revelation provides a novel explanation to a circumstance under which 
Carthage would have chosen land attack. Although at a first glance it seems that it 
would be irrational for Carthage to choose active defense under the condition 
provided in the inequalities, the model argues that if the difference of the war costs 
of land attacking and naval attacking is larger than the value of holding Roman 
territories than Carthage might have chosen land attack. If there had not been that 
stipulation, then Carthage would not have the opportunity to choose land attack, and 
would not consider selecting that action while a naval attack alternative was evident.  
 
Lastly, it is found out that Carthage chooses land attack over no attack when 
the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is greater than the ratio of the 
Carthaginian war costs from land attack and the value of holding the Roman 
territories. On this situation Chandler (1994) states that Carthage, desiring to reverse 
the outcomes of the First Punic War, had to pursue an offensive strategy and a 
militaristic action regarding a large scale attack. Staying on the defense would only 
produce more costs but would not produce a decisive victory for Carthge to compel 
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the Romans to back down; on the contrast would trigger Rome to put more war 
effort on the Carthaginian fronts by counterattacking Spain and North Africa.  
 
 In addition to revealing the circumstance in which the condition for Carthage 
to choose land attack can hold, the game model also provides the cases that nullify 
the aforementioned condition. It is observed that under the circumstances where the 
Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is equal to that of naval attack, 
the Carthaginian war costs from land attack being higher or equal to that of naval 
attack nullifies the Carthaginian land attack condition. In the circumstances where 
the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from attacking by land is smaller than that of 
attacking by sea the Carthaginian war costs of land attack being higher or equal to 
that of naval attack nullifies the Carthaginian land attack condition.  
 
 To conclude for the Carthaginian land attack decision over naval attack and no 
attack, it is observed that Carthage chooses land attack when the utility of choosing 
land attack exceeds the utilities of choosing naval attack and no attack. With regards 
to this assumption it is then reached to the condition that if the difference between 
the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from attacking by land and the Carthaginian 
likelihood of victory from attacking by sea is greater than the difference between the 
Carthaginian war costs from land attack and the Carthaginian war costs from naval 
attack is divided by the value of holding Roman territories, and if the Carthaginian 
likelihood of victory is greater than the ratio of the Carthaginian war costs from land 
attack and the value of holding Roman territories, then Carthage chooses land 
attack.   
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4.6.2. Remarks Regarding the Alternative Second Punic War Interactions 
 
 
4.6.2.1 Rome’s Passive Defense vs. Carthaginian Land Attack 
 
 It is known from history that at the outset of the Second Punic War, Carthage 
attacked by land, and Rome, which at least I argue, actively defended. However, the 
constructed game theoretic model provides the researcher a nice opportunity to 
observe other alternative interactions that might have took place in the Roman 
Carthaginian War.  With the solution of the game model, it is possible to look at the 
conditions that describe when and how the Romans would or would not choose 
passive defense over active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack, passive 
defense over active defense against a Carthaginian land attack, and when and how 
the Carthaginians would or would not choose naval attack over land attack and no 
attack. This alternative action selection looks at the possible passive defense actions 
of Rome and the alternative situation of Carthage choosing naval attack. Since, this 
part of the analysis examines an alternative history, one that has not been scrutinized 
or worked upon in the academia, the arguments generated here gives a contribution 
and a counterfactual explanation to the question of under what conditions or 
circumstances would Carthage attack by sea, or under what conditions Rome would 
opt to implement passive defense where instead of putting its armies on the field and 
push the enemy for a pitched battle would firmly hold static positions such as cities 
or harbors. 
 
 With the solution of the model, it is realized that Rome would choose passive 
defense against a Carthaginian land attack when the Roman utility inequality which 
 119 
denotes the Roman condition of choosing passive defense is satisfied under several 
circumstances. It is observed that when Rome has a higher likelihood of victory 
from passive defense, the Roman passive defense condition can hold only if the 
stipulation of having the Roman war cost difference be smaller than the value of 
holding the Roman territories exists and if the Roman war costs from active defense 
is greater than that of passive defense. In other circumstances where the cases that 
denote Rome possessing a higher likelihood of victory but equal or lower war costs 
from passive defense, it is regarded that Rome would not choose passive defense.  
Secondly, when the Roman likelihood of victory from passive defense is equal to 
that of active defense, Rome’s passive defense condition can hold only if the Roman 
war cost from passive defense is lower than that of active defense and if the cases 
where the Roman war costs from passive defense is either equal or higher than that 
of active defense does not exist.  Lastly, it is observed that the Roman condition for 
passive defense against Carthaginian land attack can hold in the cases where 
regardless the Roman war costs of passive defense, if the Roman likelihood of 
victory from passive defense is lower than that of active defense.  
 
4.6.2.2. Rome’s Passive Defense vs. Carthaginian Naval Attack 
 
 With the constructed game model, it is not only possible to explain the 
Carthaginian – Roman interactions that did took place in the Second Punic War, but 
also generate arguments that can explicate an alternative history where Carthage 
attacks by sea, and Rome defends using passive defense. It is known in history that 
Carthage, at the initial phase of the war, did not launch a major military naval 
operation toward the Romans’ Italian territories but only demonstrated minor 
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maneuvers to disrupt Roman naval position in the central Mediterranean. However, 
the game theoretic methodology and the game model presented here describes under 
what conditions or circumstances Rome would or would not implement a passive 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack. It is observed from the solution of the 
game model that only the existence or inexistence of certain conditions and cases 
would enable and satisfy the Roman decision to choose passive defense against a 
Carthaginian naval attack.  
 
 After the solution of the model, it is realized that Rome would choose passive 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack when the Roman utility inequality which 
denotes the Roman condition of choosing passive defense is satisfied under several 
circumstances. Interestingly, these circumstances and cases are parallel with the 
ones in the interaction when Carthage attacks by land and Rome passively defends. 
It is observed that when Rome has a higher likelihood of victory from passive 
defense, the Roman passive defense condition can hold only if the stipulation of 
having the Roman war cost difference be smaller than the value of holding the 
Roman territories exists, and if the Roman war costs from active defense are greater 
than that of passive defense. In other circumstances where the cases that denote 
Rome possessing a higher likelihood of victory but equal or lower war costs from 
passive defense, it is regarded that Rome would not choose passive defense.  
Secondly, when the Roman likelihood of victory from passive defense is equal to 
that of active defense, Rome’s passive defense condition can hold only if the Roman 
war cost from passive defense is lower than that of active defense and if the cases 
where the Roman war costs from passive defense is either equal or higher than that 
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of active defense does not exist.  Lastly, it is observed that the Roman condition for 
passive defense against Carthaginian land attack can hold in the cases where 
regardless the Roman war costs of passive defense, if the Roman likelihood of 
victory from passive defense is lower than that of active defense.  
 
 
4.6.2.3. Carthaginian Naval Attack Decision 
 
 Carthage, according to the historians, has selected to attack Rome via land due 
to several factors; these were the naval inferiority of Carthage, the Roman 
superiority in quality and quantity of their naval fleets, the element of surprise in the 
option of the land attack, and the Hannibal’s training and personality as a land 
general having an affect on the decision of the Carthaginians. However, with regards 
to the game theoretic model presented here, it is possible to determine under what 
circumstances Carthage would choose naval attack and provide an alternative 
explanation to the already existing explications to the historical phenomenon.  
 
 With the application of the game theoretic methodology, it is possible to argue 
that Carthage would choose naval attack when the utility of attacking by sea is 
higher than that of land attacking and no attacking. It is observed that under the 
circumstances where the Carthaginians have a higher likelihood of victory from 
naval attacking over land attacking, the Carthaginian condition for naval attack can 
hold regardless the costs of attacking by sea. Therefore even if the war costs from 
naval attack exceeds that of land attack, Carthage would still choose naval attack if 
it has higher probability of victory. In addition, when the Carthaginian likelihood of 
victory from naval attacking is equal to that of land attacking, it is observed that 
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only if the circumstance where the war cost of implementing naval attack is smaller 
than that of land attacking then the Carthaginian naval attack condition can hold, 
otherwise, if the naval attack war costs are equal or larger than that of land attack 
then the condition is nullified. Furthermore, it is revealed that under the 
circumstances where the Carthaginian likelihood of victory is smaller than that of 
land attack, the Carthaginian naval attack condition can hold only if an additional 
stipulation can be added is added to the case where the Carthaginian naval attack 
war costs is smaller than that of land attacking. In other cases, where the naval 
attack war costs are equal or higher than that of land attacking, the condition is 
nullified. Lastly, it is observed that Carthage would prefer to attack by sea to not 
attacking if the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from naval attacking is greater 
than the ration between the war costs of naval attacking and the value of holding 
Roman territories.  
 
 
4.6.2.4. The Status Quo Situation 
 
 If the model is closely scrutinized, it can be observed that the outcome of war 
is eliminated when Carthage chooses not to attack, thereby automatically ending the 
game and reaching a point where both states obtain zero payoffs. Although it is 
known from history that if Carthage would have not attacked the Romans at the 
outset of the Second Punic War, the Romans, now having the complete initiative, 
would conduct a grand offensive towards the Carthaginian territories. However, that 
Roman reaction is not taken into consideration in the model which only aims to 
create a reflection of actually observed events; not completely hypothetical 
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responses which bear the possibility of creating a whole new game with different 
payoffs or actions. Therefore, it is argued that both players would get zero payoffs if 
they end up in the status quo point.  
 
 Nevertheless, it is obvious that to reach the status quo point, both players have 
to act and regardless of the Carthaginian utilities from the implementation of land 
attack against an active or passive defending Rome and the Carthaginian utilities 
from the employment of naval attack against an active or passive defending Rome, 
Carthage chooses not to attack if the utility of not attacking is higher than the above-
mentioned Carthaginian utilities. It is observed that the Carthaginian no attack 
condition can hold in all four situations only if the Carthaginian likelihood of victory 
from land attack and naval attack is smaller than the ratio of the Carthaginian war 
costs from land attack and naval attack with the value of holding the Roman 
territories.   
 
 Therefore, it is revealed that the game model also takes into consideration the 
possibility of a Carthaginian no attack and reaches several arguments that are not 
mentioned in the historical literary analyses. Since there are no counterfactual 
explanations in the literature that deals with the conditions which render possible for 
the Carthaginians to choose no attack over its other actions, the game model 
presents a novel scrutiny which argues that regardless the Roman actions, and the 
utilities of the Carthaginian actions if the Carthaginian  utility of choosing not to 
attack is higher than that of land attacking and naval attacking Carthage would have 
chosen not to attack, and the war would not have occurred. The cases which are 
found to determine the Carthaginian condition to hold, it is observed that in all 
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circumstances, Carthage chooses not to attack if the Carthaginian likelihood of 
victory from both land and naval attacking is lesser than the division of the 
Carthaginian land and naval war costs with the value of holding Roman territories.   
 
 
4.7. Concluding Remarks Regarding the Equilibrium Analysis 
 
 After solving the constructed Second Punic War Game, analyzing the 
conditions, circumstances and cases regarding the actions of Carthage and Rome, 
and determining when and how Carthage and Rome could have selected particular 
actions in different situations, it can be stated that the findings not only are in line 
and compatible with the already existing historical analyzes, but also the game 
model had permitted the generation of new explanations to unexplained possible, 
events which might have occurred in the Second Punic War. The contributions on 
the available literature are in two fold, one the construction of the model has 
presented that the game theoretic methodology is also applicable to the wars of 
antiquity where only a handful of works exist, and that a successful game model 
which represents a war interaction, new findings which complement and stay in 
parallel to the previous historical explanations can be obtained.  
 
 When the findings for the equilibrium that reflects the interaction that was 
observed in history (Equilibrium 1), it is revealed that they were companionable and 
can be matched with the already existing historical literary evidences. Nevertheless, 
the original part was the addition of new terms such as the victory likelihood and 
costs from war to the reasons for the players to choose a particular action. As 
 125 
concluding remarks for Roman active defense choice over passive defense and 
against the Carthaginian land attack, it is found out that Rome would decide to 
implement active defense when the utility of actively defending is higher than 
passively defending and when the difference between the Roman likelihood of 
victory from implementing active defense against a land attack and Roman 
likelihood of victory from implementing passive defense against a land attack, is 
smaller than that of the difference between the Roman passive defense war costs and 
active defense war costs divided by the value of holding Roman territories.  
 
 However after the case analysis it is observed that in conjunction with the 
abovementioned Roman condition of active defense, Rome would choose active 
defense depending on several circumstances. It is observed that if Rome is in a 
position where it has high or equal amount of likelihood of victory from 
implementing active defense, it chooses active defense only if the war costs of 
active defense is lower than that of passive defense. Additionally, it is also observed 
that if Rome is in a position where it possesses low likelihood of victory from 
implementing active defense Rome would choose active defense only if the war 
costs of implementation of active defense is either lower than or equal to that of 
passive defense. And lastly if Rome is in a position where it possesses a lower 
likelihood of victory than that of passive defense it chooses active defense only if 
the war cost of actively defending is higher than that of passive defense with the 
addition of a stipulation that the difference of the war costs would be smaller than 
the value of holding Roman territories.  
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 With regards to the findings, it is also revealed that the examples from the 
historical literary evidence were compatible with the game theoretic explanations of 
Rome’s active defense decision against Carthaginian land attack. The game theoretic 
condition and cases which describe under what circumstances Rome would choose 
active defense were successfully exemplified using the previous historical strategic 
analyses. It was found out that Rome, at the various stages of the war between 218 – 
216 BC, in parallel with the historical explanations, had chosen active defense at the 
battles of Trasimene, Ager Falernus, and Cannae where acknowledging that they 
had more utility in employing active defense than that of passive defense. In 
addition, the model has presented that it was also possible to enlighten obscure areas 
within history and reveal the facts that under what circumstances the Roman choice 
of active defense might be void and therefore would not choose active defense.  
 
 The model has enabled to scrutinize a situation which had not been observed 
in actual history; this was the Roman response against a Carthaginian naval attack. 
The scrutiny over such an interaction is an innovative approach to the war where the 
literature only explains the reasons  for Rome to choose particular action against a 
land attack. However, the model helps to explain how and when Rome could reply 
with active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack. When the findings for the 
Roman active defense response against a Carthaginian naval attack is scrutinized it 
is observed that game theory can explain the condition in which Rome would choose 
active defense, when that condition can be satisfied, and what circumstances may 
nullify it. It is evident that when the Roman likelihood of victory from implementing 
active defense is higher or equal to that of passive defense, and the Roman war costs 
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from active defense being equal or lower than that of passive defense; and when 
Rome is in a position where it has low likelihood of victory from implementing 
active defense, the war costs of active defense must either be lower or at most equal 
to that of passive defense satisfies the condition to hold. On the other hand, if Rome 
is in a position where it has a high or equal likelihood of victory from active defense 
and when the war costs of employing active defense is higher or at least equal to that 
of passive defense the condition does not hold. It is also observed that the findings 
that satisfy the condition for Rome to choose active defense is compatible with the 
historical observations, and that circumstances in which Rome employs active 
defense against a Carthaginian naval attack can be exemplified through the Roman 
posture at the Roman naval raid on Africa, Roman naval operations off the coast of 
Sardinia, Lilybaeum, Vulcan Islands, and off the coast of Pisa. Apart from the 
findings which are compatible with the historical analyses, the game also revealed 
under what conditions and circumstances Rome would not implement active 
defense. Such a strategic analysis is an addition to the historical literature and 
provides an explanation in which how Rome would or would not attempt to 
implement active defense against a possible Carthaginian naval attack.  
 
 After finding the Roman conditions to choose active defense to the 
Carthaginian attack actions, to figure out the reasons behind Carthage’s choice of 
land attack the payoffs of Carthage was scrutinized.  It was then observed that for 
the Carthaginian land attack condition to hold, regardless of the war costs, the 
Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack has to be greater than that of 
naval attack, when the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from land attack is equal 
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to that of naval attack, the Carthaginian war costs from land attack has to be smaller 
than that of naval attack, and given that the Carthaginian likelihood of victory from 
land attack is smaller than that of naval attack and that the war cost from land attack 
is greater than that of naval attack, only the addition of a stipulation satisfies the 
Carthaginian condition to hold. This implies that the war costs and the likelihood of 
victory have equal affect on the Carthaginian decision.  In addition it was then 
founded that the Carthaginian land attack condition would not hold when the 
Carthaginian likelihood of victory is equal or smaller than that of naval attack and 
when the Carthaginian war costs from land attack is greater or equal to that of naval 
attack nullifies the Carthaginian choice.  
 
 When compared with the already existing historical explanations, it was 
evident that historical explanations did match with the game theoretic findings and 
that they were compatible with the arguments inferred from the game model. 
Explanations from historical analyses such as the ones of Chandler (1994), Connolly 
(1998), Hart (2002), Fields (2010), and Miles (2010) are in correspondent with the 
game theoretic findings. It is observable that not only the game model is well built 
that reflects the historical interaction, but also the inferences obtained from it is in 
line with the other explanations. The game theoretic argumentations however, only 
reveal a different perspective to the already described event and prove that using a 
different methodology, new argumentations could be produced. It is also evident 
that the solution of the game model did also bring a new inference to the already 
available literature on the Carthaginian reasons to select land attack. It adds the 
element under what conditions the Carthaginians would or would not choose land 
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attack. The conditions that signify when Carthage would not choose land attack is 
only revealed through game theoretic analysis, and does make a contribution to the 
literature in which little amount of military strategic or grand strategic explanations 
are evident.  
 
 The game model presented the opportunity to examine other alternative 
scenarios where other actions of Rome and Carthage could have take place. One of 
them was the Roman passive defense choice. The findings presented here described 
under that circumstances Rome would choose passive defense against a 
Carthaginian land attack. Since there is no evidence that the Romans did employ 
passive defense or is there any reference in the historical analyses of the scholars 
that mention a technical military term to define Rome’s actions at the first phase of 
the Second Punic War, the findings here are innovative in their essence, and present 
a new argumentation, that is a counterfactual analysis regarding an alternative 
interaction between Rome and Carthage. It was found out that in the circumstances 
where Rome possessed higher, equal, and lower likelihoods of victory from 
employing passive defense over active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack, 
except in the two cases where an addition of a stipulation regarding the ratio or 
Roman war costs and the value of holding Roman territories, the Romans would 
choose passive defense if their war costs from implementing passive defense are 
lower or equal to that of active defense. This implies that a game theoretic modeling 
and the application of game theory to explain a historical war scenario does have the 
capacity to improve the already existing, and contribute to define a reason behind an 
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alternative Roman action that had a possibility of occurrence in the Second Punic 
War.  
 
 The game theoretic findings here presented novel arguments regarding the 
Roman choice of passive defense against a Carthaginian naval attack. Since there 
are no historical explanations that explain when and why Rome could choose 
another military action than that of active defense which Rome would employ 
against a possible Carthaginian naval attack, the results observed through game 
theory contribute to the military history literature that deals with the military 
strategies and actions of states in war. The game model not only takes into 
consideration a major Carthaginian naval attack as an alternative action from the 
Punic side, but also looks at the conditions in which it seems possible for Rome to 
respond to it using passive defense. It was found out that in the circumstances where 
Rome possessed higher, equal, and lower likelihoods of victory from employing 
passive defense over active defense against a Carthaginian naval attack, except in 
the two cases where an addition of a stipulation regarding the ratio or Roman war 
costs and the value of holding Roman territories, the Romans would choose passive 
defense if their war costs from implementing passive defense are lower or equal to 
that of active defense. Similarly, these findings imply that a game theoretic 
modeling and the application of game theory to explain a historical war scenario 
does have the capacity to improve the already existing, and contribute to define a 
reason behind an alternative Roman action that had a possibility of occurrence in the 
Second Punic War. In this case it is revealed that not only the likelihood of victory 
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but also the war costs from passive defense have a profound affect on the Roman 
decision.  
 
 The game model has also examined the alternative naval attack choice of the 
Carthaginians and has looked at under what circumstances the Carthaginians would 
have selected it. It is then found out that in spite of the Roman actions, the 
Carthaginians would choose to attack by sea with respect to certain cases. These 
were regardless the Carthaginian war costs they would choose to attack by sea if the 
Carthaginian likelihood of victory from naval attacking was higher than that of land 
attacking. Secondly under circumstances where Carthage possesses equal or low 
likelihoods of victory from naval attacking compared to land attack, they would 
choose to attack by sea only if the Carthaginian war costs from naval attacking are 
smaller than that of land attacking. These findings were important because the 
available historical literary analyses tried to answer the question of why the 
Carthaginians did not choose the option of naval attack, but not the question of when 
and how they would do that. The findings therefore did reveal an important point 
and have contributed to the works of military historians by looking from a 
mathematical perspective and prevailed in generating a successful innovative 
argument to supplement the strategic aspect of the Second Punic War.  
 
 At the last part, the most interesting, that is the question of under what 
circumstances Carthage could have chosen not to attack was examined. For the 
purpose of normalization and to render the payoff comparison easier, it was decided 
that the outcome of status quo would give only zero utilities to the players.  
Therefore only the subjective estimation of Carthage choosing not to attack over 
 132 
land attack and naval attack would have ended the game at the status quo point. It 
was observed that regardless of the Roman actions, Carthage would have chosen not 
to attack if the Carthaginian likelihood of land or naval attacking is smaller than the 
ratio of the Carthaginian war costs of land or naval attacking and the value of 
holding Roman territories. These findings were significant and innovative because it 
not only enables a condition to describe when Carthage would have not attacked but 
also presented the analysis of an alternative and counterfactual event which the 
historians have not dealt with. Therefore under the framework of all the findings and 
interpretations of the model, it can be argued that game theory is applicable to 
explain events of antiquity, that new arguments can be obtained using modeling 
techniques and that in line with the historical explanations, game theoretic 
explanations are also significant in describing or real or hypothetical scenarios.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This work has shown that it is possible to model, analyze, and explain the 
strategic interaction of Rome and Carthage at the first two years of the Second Punic 
War through a game theoretic analysis. It presents that game theory is a powerful 
tool that can be used to enlighten the events of antiquity where many obscure 
elements still prove to exist and wait to be revealed through modeling analysis 
techniques. This work has proved that even though there are only a limited of its 
examples, one can model an antique war where there were less amount of 
information regarding the players’ decision making processes. Hence, the work 
deems itself to be noteworthy to the game theoretic literature.  
 
 In the first chapter the research question and its design was introduced; 
stating  that the research question for the thesis was how one can game theoretically 
model the Second Punic War, and through this methodology, how can game theory 
analyze the interaction between Carthage and Rome. It was stated that these types of 
questions were chosen because the researcher wanted to show that game theory is 
applicable in explaining conflicts of ancient history and also wanted to prove that 
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game theory is compatible with the historical observations and may even enlighten 
obscure points where the historians have neglected to explain.   
 
In Chapter II, brief historical background information was given before the 
construction of the model. It was stated that Carthage and Rome at first had cordial 
relations based on mutually agreed treaties that delineated their spheres of influences 
in the Mediterranean Sea; however the sudden eruption of local events have 
prompted both states to violently react and declare war to each other fearing that the 
other might get the upper hand in geostrategic or critical areas. The Second Punic 
War was one of those conflicts where Carthage and Rome declared war to each 
other due to a spark in a local Roman allied city. In Chapter II, it is argued that 
Carthage and Rome had distinct military strategies and military actions that favored 
their political interests. Since Carthage was following a war where it could re-
elevate itself in the western Mediterranean have preferred an offense oriented 
military strategy where it could launch a land attack, a naval attack, or stay at the 
defense (no attack). Rome similarly wanted to suppress Carthaginian ascendancy 
also preferred an offense oriented military strategy targeting the Carthaginian 
centers of gravity. However, it is stated that while the Carthaginians selected to 
attack by land due to several reasons concerning naval complications, risk factors, to 
add an element of surprise, the Romans had to give way from their initial military 
strategy to a more defense oriented approach where actions such as active defense or 
passive defense were to be chosen. In the thesis it is argued that there were no 
literary description of Roman military strategy or the military actions available to 
the Romans; hence through making inferences from the historical literature a new 
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conceptualization for Roman military measures and strategies were revealed. At the 
last part of the historical chapter a general strategic overview of the war was given 
so that it could be a foundation for the model building. 
 
In Chapter III, the construction process of the model was presented. The 
chapter addressed issues such as why game theoretic methodology was chosen or 
why a necessity to model the Second Punic War rose. By adding a literature review 
on the works regarding game theory and war analysis, I responded to these questions 
by stating that even though game theory was a powerful tool that analyzes strategic 
interactions, it neglects wars of antiquity thereby leaving a gap that could be filled 
with interesting modeling examples such as the proven here. In addition, Chapter III 
explained why an extensive form game was chosen to be constructed, why those 
players of Rome and Carthage were selected, why was it necessary to define the 
temporal and spatial domains of the model, what was the actions, payoffs, and 
outcomes of the model were, and how the actual game tree  was established. It was 
shown that through an extensive analysis of history, it is possible to address the 
necessities that game theoretic modeling requires and an accurate conceptualization 
and operationalization can be achieved. Lastly, it was stated that there were 12 
possible equilibria conditions which can be obtained using the solution of backward 
induction; however only Equilibrium 1 directly reflected the actual historic event, 
others were hypothetical equilibria with little or no evidence from history.  
 
Chapter IV presented the solution and interpretation of the model using 
backward induction. Such a solution technique was chosen because it is regarded as 
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an efficient way to calculate best responses of player within a model. Through the 
backward induction Rome’s and Carthage’s action choices and responses towards 
each other were revealed and it was observed that both players selected their actions 
with regards to the satisfaction of certain conditions and the existence of certain 
cases. These conditions and cases were found out after defining an inequality that 
denoted the circumstances for a player to choose a particular action. Apart from this, 
the solution of the model presented under what conditions the player would have not 
chosen those actions thereby displaying not only alternative scenarios but also 
making innovative inferences from them.  
 
Furthermore, it was revealed that the findings of the model were compatible 
with the historical literary evidence and they can be supplement or support the 
arguments of historians. This shows that the Second Punic War Extensive Form 
Game presented here was successful in capturing the essential aspects of the Roman 
– Carthaginian interaction. In addition, it is possible to state that Rome and Carthage 
were rational actors, who have according to Livy (1972) and Polybius (1984) did 
make certain strategic calculations based on their perceptions and estimations that 
would guide them under the fog of war. This was possible to observe when Rome 
altered its military strategy when fully learning that Carthage has chosen all out 
offense as its military strategy and land attack as its military action  
 
A major problem in interpreting the model was to find literary evidences that 
were in parallel with the findings of the model. A large percent of the available 
written work were descriptive and had little amount of analytical viewpoints. Hence, 
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it was understood that game theorists neglect wars of ancient times where literary 
evidence is either too low, or does not adequately explain a decision taken by an 
individual or by a state for a particular reason.  In addition, it was observed that even 
though there was an immense literature on the history of Rome, there were low 
amount of information or analysis concerning its military strategies during the 
Middle Republic Era. It was surprising to see that even though most historians have 
conceptualized or defined the particular action sequence taken by Fabius during his 
6 month dictatorship, there was no conceptualization regarding the military strategy 
of Rome as a whole or the name of the military movements which Rome has 
followed during the Second Punic War.  
 
To make a further addition to the work presented here, it is believed that 
much more interesting and much more complex argumentations are ready to be 
solved using backward induction and thus ready to make greater contributions to 
game theoretic and military history literature. However, a major concern is the 
amount of effort to be given to solve a two person perfect information game with 
abstract payoffs. Therefore, in future studies it is intended to work with a computer 
program which would more efficiently produce results concerning solution of the 
game. Another area for additional work is the modeling of the second and third 
phases of the Second Punic War. The model presented here have only dealt with the 
military actions of Rome and Carthage between 218 and 216 BC, therefore with the 
insertion of newer payoffs and newer actions, it is possible to integrate another time 
frame into the model.  In the second phase of the Second Punic War it is possible to 
see that both Rome and Carthage have abandoned their initial strategies and have 
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opted for a balanced military strategy combining offense and defense. Further 
additions into the model have not only the capacity to include the Roman 
Carthaginian interactions between 215 – 207 BC but also provide a foundation base 
for analyzing other antique wars such as the Pyrrhic Wars or the Roman Persian 
Wars. As long as there is a solid methodology, there are always room for new 
experiments and new findings.  
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